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ABSTRACT 
A Study of the Effect of the Presence of Social 
Responsibility Information on the Investment 
Decision of the Individual Investor 
in Corporate Stocks 
(September 1980) 
F. Ellen McKay, B.S., University of Massachusetts/Amherst 
M.Ed., University of Massachusetts/Amherst 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts/Amherst 
Directed by: Dr. Ula K. Motekat 
Corporations are increasingly being called upon to disclose 
actions outside the sphere of traditional business. Corporate reti¬ 
cence toward making such social disclosures may be due partly to a fear 
that their many publics may react adversely to such information. One 
of the most important groups to which the company reports is the poten¬ 
tial or current investor. Most of the literature to date deals with the 
current investor's reactions to corporate social disclosures. Little 
study has been made of the affect of social disclosure on the invest¬ 
ment decision itself. 
This study examines the impact of several types of social dis¬ 
closure on the initial investment decision of members of several ac¬ 
counting and finance-oriented professional groups. Previous studies in¬ 
dicate that institutional investors were concerned with corporate 
vi 
social policies of firms in which they held investments. Other studies 
found that bankers, financial analysts and university finance officers 
did not share this interest. The impact of the several types of finan¬ 
cial and social information on the investment decision was also ex¬ 
amined to determine if any changes in investment strategy occurred in 
the presence of social disclosure. These data were used to derive the 
existence of a function for predicting the amount invested in a company 
in terms of the importance that the potential investor attributed to the 
financial information that he or she received. The total sample con¬ 
sisted of seventy-eight subjects. 
The data were analyzed using Student’s t-test to determine the 
statistical significance of any difference in the investment patterns 
or strategies when companies disclosed social information concerning 
charitable contributions, pollution, relations with personnel, cor¬ 
porate illegality, international involvement, product quality and com¬ 
munity involvement. The results were confirmed using a multiple regres¬ 
sion with dummy variable. 
The hypothesis concerning the existence of the predicator func¬ 
tion was tested using Kendall’s tau test and a multiple regression 
analysis. 
The following conclusions were reached: 
1. Investors significantly increase the amount invested in 
companies that disclose positive pollution-related behavior. 
2. The disclosure of a company’s actions revitalizing and ex¬ 
panding a plant in a major metropolitan area causes increased 
vii 
investment. 
3. Disclosures of corporate reimbursement to employees for 
previously discriminatory salary practices and a government-forced 
product withdrawal produce significant decreases in investment 
amounts. 
4. Investors do not respond to disclosure of court-levied 
fines to corporations or of corporate illegalities. 
5. Social information does not affect the investment decision 
when the financial information of the firms under consideration dif¬ 
fers substantially. 
6. The investor seeks to justify his/her investment by chang¬ 
ing investment strategies. 
7. There does not exist a function to predict the amount in¬ 
vested in a company in terms of the investor-attributed importance of 
the eight financial ratios used in this study. 
These results have led the author to conclude that there is need 
for substantial additional research in an area that has been previously 
unexplored. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility Information; 
A Perspective 
The social awareness and concern of the American public that 
grew out of the social policies of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 
during the 1960’s have helped to alter attitudes and values within 
the American corporate community. No longer can business afford to 
treat consumers under the doctrine of caveat emptor. Businesses that 
maintain this policy will likely face such responses as product 
boycotts, shareholder rebellions, and costly lawsuits. Firms that 
emphasize the caveat emptor ethos do so to enhance profits, yet, 
ironically, the same firms incur an erosion of profits due to these 
adverse consumer responses. 
In 1962, President John F. Kennedy enunciated the first listing 
of consumer rights. These included: 
(1) the right to safety from goods that are dangerous to 
health or life; 
(2) the right to be protected against misleading or deceiving 
marketing practices which deny the consumer the ability 
to make an informed choice; 
(3) the right to be heard in the government's formation of 
consumer policy.^ 
1 
2 
Although the consumer was guaranteed protection from unsafe 
goods almost two decades ago, today’s numerous product recalls on 
everything from airplanes to foodstuffs demonstrate that protection 
remains inadequate. Although it is unlikely that defective goods 
represent willful attempts to harm the consumer, they do reflect 
problems in our economic system. Unsafe goods can result from 
(1) either accidental or deliberate human error; (2) the failure 
of technology to keep pace with invention; (3) the failure of 
safety procedures to keep pace with technology; or (4) insufficient 
understanding of human tolerance levels. No matter what the source 
of the difficulties, the corporation remains liable. 
The guarantee that the consumer will be adequately and truth¬ 
fully informed is met by unit labeling and health warnings and dis¬ 
claimers on packages. However, the era of short packaging and 
deceptive media advertising is still not past. The consumer still 
» 
must be aware of possible deception and should know how to take 
action against it. 
Consumer agencies at many levels of government help protect 
the public by guaranteeing its safety and by fulfilling its right to 
be heard on consumer issues. The emerging voice of consumers has 
engendered legislation involving truth in lending, truth in advertising, 
and deceptive labeling practices. 
The right to disclosure is also needed by the investor in a 
firm’s stock. Full and accurate corporate disclosure is necessary 
because the investor has certain investment criteria that limit the 
number of investment choices. Once an investment is made, the investor 
3 
risks losing his/her investment should the company fail to make an 
adequate profit. Information is also needed to aid the investor in 
reevaluating his/her investment program. 
Government at all levels is also demanding information on 
areas not previously reported. Protection of the general public 
from environmental pollution has taken form in legislation that 
restricts the actions of business. Governmental intervention in 
the area of employee safety has engendered child labor laws and the 
protection of workers from hazardous materials on the job. Moreover, 
adverse publicity and governmental fines have discouraged company 
discrimination based on age, sex, race, or national origin. 
The areas of corporate disclosure demanded by the public 
have also changed. As the emphasis of government has shifted to 
social issues, the public has become more socially aware. In 
Hester's words 
The public wants business to contribute a good deal more to 
achieving the goals of a good society . . , Business enter¬ 
prises, in effect, are being asked to contribute more to 
the quality of American life than just supplying quantities 
of goods and services.^ 
Indeed, consumer pressure is forcing business disclosures in such areas 
as corporate service to the community and employee programs that extend 
beyond those normally associated with the workplace. 
Not only the consumer is demanding that corporations increase 
and disclose their social activities. According to Blake 
Larger and larger numbers of people in all walks of life, 
including many prominent business leaders, now believe 
that corporations should actively pursue socially res¬ 
ponsible goals. That means reducing pollution, building 
more safety and reliability into products, providing more 
and better employment and advancement opportunities for 
4 
minorities and women, making work more meaningful, more 
satisfying, and safer for all employees, and generally 
promoting the well-being of society in numerous ways.^ 
The list of important government officials advocating corporate 
disclosures includes Vice-President Walter Mondale.^ Concern from 
high-ranking government officials may lead to additional government 
control and intervention should companies fail to act voluntarily. 
Pressure from special interest groups and governments has 
induced corporations to increasingly reveal their social activities 
c z: 
to the public through advertising and annual reports. ,D Corporations 
have advanced substantially in their attempts to better understand 
their public; however, corporations have far to go in reaching the 
goal of a fully and honestly informed public. 
1.2 Scope, of the Project 
The scope of the study is to investigate the effect of social 
responsibility information on the investment decisions of the individual 
investor in corporate securities. The social information will be 
presented to the subject along with financial ratios based on data of 
real companies. The subjects will be asked to make a forced-choice 
allocation of a fixed sum of money between the companies. The subjects 
will also be asked to indicate what information influenced their mone¬ 
tary allocations. 
The objectives of this study are 
(1) to ascertain the effect of corporate actions that are 
incompatible with current concepts of social responsibility 
on the investment decision of the individual investor; 
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(2) to assess the effect on such investnent decisions of 
the reporting of positive social information; 
(3) to ascertain the predictive function under which such 
investment decisions are made. 
1.3 Need for Research in the Area 
Although there have been studies done by Longstreth and 
Rosenbloom (1973), Busby and Falk (1979) and Benjamin and Stanga 
(1977) on the effect of social disclosure on institutional investors, 
this seems to be the first attempt to study the effect of disclosure 
on the individual investor. Considering the reluctance of corporations 
to disclose any more information than is legally required, there is 
a shortage of information on areas that, in fact, do influence the 
publics which the corporation serves. This type of study can be used 
to help persuade corporations that not all social disclosure is harmful. 
In summary, there is a great need for additional research in 
the area of the investor and social responsibility information. The 
results found in this study represent a narrow solution to the broad 
question of the effect of social disclosure on the individual investor. 
1.4 Significance of this Project 
As the first known study in this area, the significance of 
this research is far-reaching. The results of this study should prove 
useful to future accounting researchers who may want to expand the 
research subjects to include either a more diverse segment of the 
general public or more specialized professional groupings such as 
6 
financial analysts or investment brokers. Researchers may also extend 
this study's findings to determine critical types of social information 
or the effect of monetary amounts on investment decision-makers. 
Researchers in the areas of finance and investor behavior can use 
these results to better understand the effects of information not 
contained in traditional financial statements on the decision-making 
process of the investor. Researchers in sociology and psychology 
can utilize these results to examine the social awareness and invest¬ 
ment decision-making of corporate financial executives. 
This information can also benefit investment counsellors by 
providing them with previously unknown investor buying strategies. 
With this knowledge, counsellors may be able to influence the investor 
by accenting certain social disclosures made by a potential investment. 
The impact of this information transcends investment decisions to 
include a possible effect on the market price of the stock. The 
stock market may react to disclosures of corporate illegality and 
legal settlements. Accordingly, applications of the results of this 
research could be used by economists and market analysts in predicting 
investor behavior which then may extend to the market. 
Accounting bodies that establish the rules governing the 
accounting profession may be able to use the results of this study to 
determine the need for requiring corporate social disclosure. Academi¬ 
cians who establish accounting curricula may be able to use the results 
of this study to help justify the increasing need for courses in 
behavioral accounting. 
The corporate executive and the person within the corporation 
who establish corporate policy with potential social impact can use 
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the results of this study as an indication of the impact of social 
disclosure on the marketability of the corporation's stock. The 
corporate executives and members of the Board of Directors that are 
responsible for the disclosures in the corporate annual report may 
use this study to evaluate the potential impact of such disclosures. 
Institutional investors and mutual fund managers may compare 
the results of this study with the criteria they use in making their 
investment decisions to guide them in better representing their consti¬ 
tuencies. Government officials who regulate accounting disclosure may 
be able to use the results to justify changes in existing disclosure 
requirements. 
Lastly, the field of accounting will benefit from this study 
because it explores the impact of corporate social disclosure on one 
group of users of accounting information. It will also aid in answering 
questions of whether accounting disclosure should be extended to include 
social information. 
This chapter introduced basic concepts and issues in the area 
of corporate social responsibility. It then discussed the scope of 
this project and the need for research on the effect of corporate social 
disclosure on the individual investor, and concluded with a section on 
the significance of this project to the many constituencies of accounting. 
The next chapter provides a review of the relevant literature in the 
areas of social disclosure and reporting. 
CHAPTER I NOTES 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter contains a review of the literature concerning 
corporate social behavior and of accounting for such activities. 
The first section deals with the various philosophies under 
which the U.S. corporation has historically interacted with its 
environment. It includes an assessment of possible reasons for the 
firm's current role in society. The next section discusses the 
various elements of society that the firm affects and how they, 
in turn, influence corporate action. The third section contains a 
state-of-the-art discussion of corporate social activities and 
examines trends in corporate social reporting and reasons for those 
trends. The next section of this chapter examines social reporting 
systems that have appeared in the literature. This chapter concludes 
with a description of the process audit which can provide adequate 
reporting of corporate social actions to bridge the gap between no social 
reporting and complete reporting. 
2.1 History 
According to Sheldon and Parke'*' the relationship between business 
and society can be divided into three segments. At present, corporate 
behavior is a mixture of all three. 
Since the Industrial Revolution, the corporation has been 
expected to deal fairly and honestly with clients in pursuing its 
9 
10 
primary goal of making a profit. The principal exponent of this 
philosophy today is economist Milton Friedman. These expectations 
have not always corresponded to corporate actions, however. Thus, 
the watchword for consumers has always been ’’let the buyer beware." 
Until relatively recently, there has been virtually no inexpensive, 
rapid vehicle for the consumer to press grievances against companies 
that seemed to pursue profits regardless of societal costs. The 
behavior of the majority of businesses has seldom been so self- 
serving and callous as the stereotype discussed above. Most business- 
persons who espouse the first or "traditionalist" view contribute 
to society through community service or charitable donations. 
Since the early 1900’s, the responsibility of the firm to 
society has been extended under a second, "expansionist" philosophy. 
The responsibility of the firm is extended to include responsibility 
to employees and products as well as to many of the ideals and values 
of the larger society. 
Under this philosophy, the employee received an increase in 
fringe benefits, such as medical and retirement plans. However, this 
improved treatment of the worker by the employer may have been due 
largely to the rise in the strength and power of organized labor 
rather than to concern on the part of the corporation. Likewise, 
improvement of products is probably as much the result of techno¬ 
logical advancement as concern for the consumer. 
More recently, the involvement of the firm with society has 
assumed a third, or "activist," posture. The firm has become a 
catalyst for social change towards moral ends even though they may 
transcend the normal function of business. In addition to a genuine 
concern for society on the part of corporations, several other 
factors could be influencing corporate behavior. The rise of watchdog 
organizations, such as those of Ralph Nader, and the increase in the 
emphasis on consumer protection, as evidenced by new laws and agencies, 
have forced corporations to look critically at their behavior. Moreover 
the desire for positive public relations in an increasingly competitive 
marketplace may be influencing corporate behavior. 
The results of two studies reported by Anshen^ indicate that 
corporate managers widely agree with the "traditionalist” philosophy. 
Specifically, the managers cite corporate adherence to major laws, 
lawful treatment of employees, honesty in dealing with others, 
truthful financial reporting, fair returns on investments to share¬ 
holders, and equal employment opportunity at the entry level. 
Characteristics of the expansionist philosophy are espoused 
a 
by a majority of firms in most locations. These tenets extend those 
of the first group to include budgeting for social benefits, charitable 
contributions with limitations, truth in advertising, safe products 
as well as production processes, improved employee benefits, equal 
employment opportunity at all levels, and the recording of socially 
responsible action. 
A minority of the managers agreed with the "activist'' philosophy 
which recommends active efforts at equal employment, reducing pollution 
and improving the environment, improving the quality of life for all 
the constituents of the firm, and improving social justice. Public 
reporting of these activities was to take the form of an annual report 
similar to the financial report now issued. 
These results contrast with the view of Cooper and Raiborn^ 
who saw the "traditionalist" view evolving into the minority opinion. 
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They quote a Committee for Economic Development document which at¬ 
tributed that change to a change in the interests of stockholders.^ 
Due to the holding of investments in several firms, the document 
contends, stockholders are now interested in the corporate sector 
as a whole rather than in the success of any one company. 
The results of a study by the Council of Trends and Perspec¬ 
tive of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce^ indicate that the activism of 
the third phase of corporate social responsibility is itself divided 
into three segments: (1) recognition of the need for corporate social 
action; (2) planning such activities, which involves the establishment 
of goals not dissimilar to the process used for traditional business 
behavior; and (3) implementing and evaluating these plans. 
In The Social Audit for Management, Abt^ discusses four advances 
in business which he feels have been responsible for the increased 
interest of the corporation in society. According to Abt, automation 
is one of the advances responsible for this changed emphasis. Automa¬ 
tion and the mass distribution of products has lowered worker pride 
in the goods that workers produce. This results in a lack of need 
satisfaction through job identification. In addition, the shortened 
workweek and increased worker boredom has resulted in the worker 
looking to the company to supply the resources to enable him/her to 
have a higher quality of both life and leisure time. To satisfy 
these demands, the company is forced to provide a more pleasant 
living and working environment for its employees as well as to 
sponsor many types of extra work activities. These activities, such 
as social, recreational, and sporting groups, as well as personal 
advancement opportunities, serve both to strengthen the allegiance 
that the worker feels for his/her employer and to replace the need 
satisfaction previously found in the job setting. 
According to Abt, the second factor contributing to the rise 
of corporate social involvement is industrialization. Abt believes 
that industrialization increases environmental pollution. The idea 
that the earth and its environs is a free good in the economic sense 
is becoming obsolete. Some of the factors that may have contributed 
to this change are atmospheric pollution so extensive that it can 
block the sun’s rays, the inability to use natural waterways for 
recreation, and the extinction or near extinction of many species of 
life with the resultant upset of the natural order. 
The third factor that Abt indicates has increased corporate 
social involvement is the unanticipated social costs imposed by 
technical advances, such as nuclear weapons. The development of 
such advanced technology with its potential dangers has induced 
corporations to take preventative measures to guard against accident 
occurring before, during or after the production process. The costs 
incurred include protection of the employees and the environment 
against harm as well as social actions taken to insure positive 
public relations. 
Abt indicates that the fourth factor influencing corporate 
social involvement is a difference between public expectations re¬ 
sulting from technical advances and the ability of government and 
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industry to implement those advances to the satisfaction of various 
interest groups. Once an announcement is made of a technological 
breakthrough, the public expects the product to be immediately 
available at a minimum cost and to be perfectly safe and reliable 
from the very beginning. However, demands for safety and reliability 
have resulted in increased waiting periods for new products as well 
as higher costs. The response (i.e., lawsuits) of the public to 
situations in which product safety is questioned has resulted in 
the firm becoming more socially sensitive, sometimes even extending 
product testing to extreme measures. 
2.2 Influences on Corporate Social Behavior 
There are many publics that influence corporate social behavior. 
Their individual concerns as well as interaction affect the corporation 
in a variety of ways.^ 
The owners of the firm are concerned with the quality and 
security of their own lives. Accordingly, pressure is put on the firm 
and its owners to produce products which are successful enough to enable 
the corporation to pay the investor a satisfactory return on his/her 
investment. Many investors are also concerned with the ways in which 
the firm interacts with the world around it. Disclosure of expenditures 
on pollution abatement, charitable giving and community involvement are 
frequently encouraged. Some owners are willing to accept less return 
in exchange for corporate social involvement. By selling their 
holdings, some investors respond negatively to a lack of corporate 
social involvement or to detrimental corporate social policies. Other 
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investors attempt to instigate change by introducing legislation at 
stockholders’ meetings or by attempting to change the membership of 
the board of directors to represent a more positive social stance. 
Another concern held by both the stockholders as a group and 
the business sector as a whole is that additional costs brought about 
by social pressures from consumers will cause a decline in the quality 
and availability of goods and services. The additional expenditures 
for social programs can result in the discontinuance of marginal 
products and even marginal firms. This phenomenon can also result 
in a decrease in the availability of products previously produced by 
those firms. In addition, firms that survive the increased expenditure 
may be forced to either decrease production of the goods or decrease 
the quality of the goods produced in an effort to reduce costs. The 
impact of these activities on the economy can be substantial. This 
increase in cost may result in decreased earnings which affect the 
return to the shareholders in the form of dividends. It also serves 
to discourage potential investors by increasing the attractiveness of 
competitors. Increasing prices caused by a need to offset rising 
costs can result in decreased sales and a similar end result. 
Employees will also suffer from the possible demise of the firm or 
decrease in its production. If the firm remains viable, the employees 
may suffer economically by having their incomes fail to keep pace 
with inflation. Likewise, fringe benefits may have to be curtailed 
or work hours reduced. 
The effects, however, are not limited to those publics directly 
concerned with the firm but encompass the lives and environments of 
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all the residents in a geographic area. A company which reduces its 
work force creates more unemployment which results in increased 
reliance of individuals on government income programs, more idle 
time with less money to pursue leisure activities, and increased 
psychological depression which can result in increased crime, 
alcoholism, and less stable marriages and families. In addition 
to these problems, the demise of the firm will result in decreased 
government revenue which will then have to be compensated for by 
the remaining revenue sources. 
The general public also responds to these difficulties by 
expressing concern with the stability, survival, and growth of the 
traditional economic system. These fears may manifest themselves in 
an unwillingness to save money, which reduces the money that financial 
institutions have to lend, and a corresponding decrease in economic 
growth. Increased consumer demand can also push prices higher and 
thus promote inflation. 
The investor may also have difficulty in comparing firms, 
industries and geographical locations to facilitate the investment 
decision.^ Unless firms disclose their social actions completely, 
financial statements may mislead the user. The investor also needs 
to compare whether corporate social actions are mandated by law, or 
are undertaken voluntarily. S/he also needs to determine whether 
problems are unique to a specific industry or to a geographical 
location. This information will help the potential investor make 
an educated decision. 
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The attempts of interest groups to influence corporate 
behaviors, policies, and attitudes toward the environment can 
produce corporate responses that conflict with the aims of other 
interest groups. Various methods are used by these groups to modify 
the policies and actions of corporations to more acceptable levels. 
For example, investors may adopt portfolio policies favoring firms 
that exhibit socially responsible behavior.^ Educational institu 
tions are frequently forced by their constituents to adopt policies 
which preclude investment in firms whose policies are not considered 
to be socially responsible. Examples are investments in countries 
with restrictive racial policies and companies involved in the 
manufacture of armaments and other implements of war. 
Individual investors who wish to adopt such investment 
policies with their personal portfolios can invest in mutual funds 
whose portfolios consist entirely of firms exhibiting socially 
responsible corporate behavior.The recent failure of at least 
one of these funds may indicate that the individual investor may not 
be concerned with the social policies of potential investments until 
after the investment is made. This appears to verify the results of 
12 
the studies by Benjamin and Stanga11 (1977) and Buzbv and Falk 
(1979) . 
Institutional investors in both the profit and not-for- 
profit sectors are using proxy challenges as devices to force 
disclosure of corporate social policies.13 This type of action 
by large investors can influence the actions of management. Even 
if the investors involved do not have votes necessary to sustain 
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the challenge at the stockholders' meeting, the questions raised 
and awareness aroused in the minds of other shareholders as well as 
possible reporting of the actions in the financial press may have 
long-term ramifications on the reporting firm. 
Organized efforts to influence corporate social actions, 
originating with the Kodak-FIGHT Campaign of Saul D. Alinsky^ in 
1967, have been used with increasing frequency since then. The 
tactic used in Alinsky's campaign and duplicated many times there¬ 
after involves (1) the identification of an area of social action, 
(2) possible negotiation with management to persuade them to change 
corporate social policy and, when that fails, (3) carrying the issue 
to the shareholders through proxy proposals. 
The impact of these organized efforts has apparently been 
substantial. "By casting a spotlight on the social impact of 
business policies, FIGHT and its progeny appear to have caused some 
institutional shareholders to reconsider the old assumptions and 
attitudes"-^ toward investment criteria. 
The response of potential investors to corporate social policy 
is seen in studies of the paper industry by Alice Tepper Marlin. Her 
results indicate a direct relationship between investor concern and 
positive corporate action relative to pollution and stock prices. 
Although this relationship may be attributable to investor concern 
about pollution, it may also reflect the support of a farsighted 
management. Further verification of this phenomenon has been 
observed by a major financial institution. One of its executives has 
observed that "Companies that follow enlightened policies usually have 
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about them an atmosphere that is conducive to future growth. And 
this makes them highly attractive to the investor. 
Actions not influenced by current or future investors may 
be forced upon corporations by government intervention and regulation. 
Increasing awareness of the environment, the health and safety of 
workers and of consumer issues have brought about such agencies as 
the Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration and the Consumer Protection Agency. Along with this 
growing governmental bureaucracy have come myriad laws empowering 
these agencies to enforce legislation and policies involving affirma¬ 
tive action, mandatory retirement, sexual harassment, and equal pay 
for equal work. A large number of positive corporate social policies 
have come about either because of voluntary compliance with these laws 
or from litigation due to noncompliance. 
2.3 Patterns in Corporate Social Action 
Corporate behavior indicates that corporate priorities for 
social action have changed. The first pattern that emerged was an 
increase in disclosure. This was revealed in the results of the 
annual Ernst & Ernst Social Responsibility Disclosure. A comparison 
of corporate social disclosure revealed an increase in the percentage 
of corporations reporting their actions from 59.6% in the 1973 annual 
report to 91.2% in the 1977 report. The 1973 report showed a slight 
decline to 89.2%. The areas of corporate concern reported in corporate 
annual reports are (1) the environment, (2) minority employment, 
(3) corporate responsibility to personnel, (4) community involvement. 
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(5) product improvement, ’ and (6) energy concerns/ 
Another researcher found less reporting on the environment, 
human resources, community involvement and product related information 
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and more reporting in the areas of energy and fair business practices. 
Various reasons have been offered for the shift in emphasis in corporate 
disclosure. According to Dierkes and Bauer: 
The distribution of different subject areas over time 
indicates that the content of demands and pressures for 
more social responsibility and involvement of business 
is not constant but, perhaps follows the changing 
consciousness of people, the rapid escalation of 
aspirations concerning different dimensions of quality 
of life, and waves of intellectual fashions and public 
attention . . .23 
In addition, corporate fear of the imposition of stringent requirements 
on corporate operations by either the general public^ or government 
may be a contributing factor to corporate disclosure. The American 
Accounting Association25 has indicated several additional motivations. 
The fear of costly lawsuits and the resultant bad publicity 
may influence corporate behavior. An example of such actions appeared 
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in newspapers on February 26, 1980 under an Associated Press byline.^0 
It reported the dismissal of a stockholders’ suit against Uniroval, 
Inc., in which the firm was charged with paying bribes and making il¬ 
legal payments. Additional charges of sex discrimination were tacitly 
confirmed in the article which reported a $4.2 million settlement of 
a civil rights suit. Reports indicating possible corporate illegalities 
as well as the sizable expenses for defending against litigation may 
affect the potential corporate investor. Disclosure of such negative 
corporate actions before they appear in the newspapers may decrease 
the impact of such articles. 
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Negative disclosure in corporate annual reports may also be 
viewed as preventive. Actions taken against a firm by people upset 
by corporate policy have taken the form of product boycotts, indus¬ 
trial sabotage and organized political pressure on preventive 
legislation. 
Corporations may disclose positive information for a variety 
of reasons. Basic to all these may be a desire to influence the 
behavior of the public and thus insure corporate survival and long 
range profits. This desire may be due to a need to improve the 
corporate public image. Positive disclosure may be necessary to 
overcome reports of previous negative behavior such as that noted 
in the Uniroyal incident, or to increase public knowledge or overcome 
misconceptions about the firm. A decrease in market share or drop 
in the market price of the stock of a firm may indicate a need for 
corporate image building. 
A final reason for corporate social disclosure may be genuine 
altruistic social concern. Corporations that subscribe to the 
"activist” posture of Sheldon and Parke (1975) may entertain unselfish 
motives of social action and related disclosures. 
Corporate social actions as reported in financial statements 
may not, in fact, be indicative of what is occurring within firms. 
The results of a study by Epstein et al.^ for the National Associa¬ 
tion of Accountants indicated a discrepancy between the importance 
attributed by firms to the areas of social concern and the extent of 
social accounting actually used in those areas. This may indicate 
a perceived difficulty in determining what costs to account for or 
a philosophy of "give them what they want to hear." 
22 
2.4 Methods of Reporting 
Corporations reporting social actions to the public seem 
to be finding difficulties in determining the best form that these 
reports should take. 
An elementary method that is frequently adopted as the 
first step in corporate reporting is essentially descriptive. 
An example of such reporting appeared in the 1977 annual 
report of BankAmerica: 
Workmen installed the first two of 29 solar collectors on the 
roof of a Bank of America branch going up in Palm Desert in 
Southern California. Specifically designed to incorporate 
new heating and cooling technology, the million-dollar 
structure is an example of the bank's commitment to energy 
conservation and use of alternative energy sources.28 
Generally, in this descriptive approach, the firm takes an 
inventory of its actions 7 and reports them narratively either in 
footnotes to existing statements or through the creation of new 
accounts. Such descriptions are largely nonquantitative. In the 
1973 Supplement to the Accounting Pveview, the Committee on Environ¬ 
mental Effects of Organized Behavior indicated that such descriptions 
should be used by corporations to report (1) environmental problems, 
(2) organizational goals to effect pollution abatement, (3) the 
progress of abatement procedures, and (4) disclosures of material 
environmental effects on the financial position earnings, and 
business activities of the organization.^® According to Linowes, 
this type of reporting, although most beneficial for internal use, 
could be attested to bv the independent auditor if required for 
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external disclosure. 
The second level of measurement is illustrated in the 1977 
annual report to Western Electric: 
Conserving materials through recycling has been a way of 
life in the Company for over fifty years. During the year 
we added two new recycling procedures to our repertoire. 
One technique to recycle the excess plastic produced during 
normal cable manufacture is saving 800,000 pounds of 
polyethylene annually, the equivalent of 230,000 gallons 
of oil. A water recycling technique used in the electro¬ 
plating process is saving 100,000 gallons of water a day. 
Using the descriptive technique of level one, this measurement level 
attempts to "determine the extent of the efforts being expended in 
O O 
each of the socially responsible activities. "~>J This level of 
measurement is primarily nonfinancial and deals with measurement 
of the costs to both the owners of the firm and to other constituents 
O / 
of the firm. 4 The immediate outputs of the action or process are 
also subjected to similar measurements. No evaluation is made of 
the "worth" of the output.33 The Western Electric disclosure is a 
measure of such outputs. 
The third level of measurement of corporate social action is 
to assign financial measures to the inputs and outputs of the action. 
To do this it is necessary to identify wThat is being accomplished as 
37 
well as to establish some value of these actions to society. 
Establishing the cost to the firm is relatively simple and 
subject to the attest function. An example of this type of reporting 
is taken from the 1977 annual report of Inland Steel: 
To further improve air and water quality, the Company 
expended $32.9 million for air and $13.2 million for 
water pollution control equipment during 1977 . . . 
Annual operating and maintenance costs for pollution 
control climbed 18 percent in 1977, totalling $24.6 
million . . .3® 
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It should be noted that the reporting process has frequently failed 
in the determination of monetary benefits of such programs. Esti¬ 
mated cost benefits of other programs are easily reported while the 
corresponding costs are either immeasurable or are determined to be 
immaterial. An example of this level of reporting is found in the 
disclosure of two programs to reduce lighting in office areas at 
Abbott Laboratories. 
An estimated $95,000 will be saved annually when the 
programs are in full effect at Abbott Park, the company’s 
headquarters ... An additional amount, estimated at up 
to $20,000 annually at Abbott Park, will be saved when 
the second lighting program is put into effect. ^ 
The difficulty in determining monetary costs and benefits of 
corporate social actions that are becoming increasingly complex may 
be the cause of a phenomenon noted in the Ernst and Ernst study. 
This study showed a slight decline in the number of firms making 
monetary quantifications of their social responsibility disclosures 
between 1976 and 1977. A similar decrease in the number of firms 
making quantified disclosures of either a monetary or nonmonetary 
, 40 
nature was noted. 
Given the difficulty in determining the exact monetary quanti¬ 
fications of the costs and benefits of corporate social action, 
several surrogate measures have been suggested by Estes.^ One 
commonly suggested valuation measure is the exchange price. Diffi¬ 
culties arise in using this measure for several reasons. Many of the 
costs or benefits that one wishes to measure are not exchanged on 
markets and, hence, lack an established market price. Even in cases 
where there is a market, the assumption that the price of a good 
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represents the value of that good to the marginal customer may be 
invalid. Rather, there frequently exists a downward sloping demand 
curve and customers who are willing to pay more than the market 
price for a good. The difference between what a consumer will pay 
and the market price (called consumer surplus) must be factored into 
the market price. The determination of the consumer surplus may be 
difficult if not impossible given the constraints under which firms 
market their goods and services. In addition, the aggregation of 
monetary measures can prove difficult because of different accounting 
techniques, the changing time-value of money, and the instability of 
the purchasing pow7er of monetary units. 
Another approach to the measurement of social costs is the 
use of surrogate values or shadow7 prices. The difficulty wTith the 
latter measure is the exclusion of the consumer's surplus in the 
establishment of the price. In using a surrogate value, measurement 
is made of some item that may be expected to have the same utility 
as the item in question. The difficulty with this type of measure 
is the possibility of measuring an inappropriate surrogate or of 
making an incorrect assumption about the relation between the value 
of the surrogate and the value of the item in question. 
Another way of assessing the value of social actions is the 
survey of ranking of alternatives by the individuals affected. The 
danger with this approach is the unconscious bias of participants who 
try to "give the inquirer what he/she wants to hear." 
Negative social actions may be evaluated by determining the 
cost to correct the damage and, in some cases that cannot be fully 
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corrected, the cost of further damage. When donated goods or 
services are valuated, an appraisal can be sought from someone 
qualified to make such an estimate. Care must be taken, however, 
to avoid using appraisals that are biased or unrealistic. Litigation 
may assign monetary value to actions or conditions which may approxi¬ 
mate social costs. It must be remembered, however, that the parties 
that make monetary awards may be swayed by emotion or other factors. 
Therefore, court awards may only approximate the social costs of the 
action or only represent the costs to one segment of society affected. 
It is possible to determine certain types of social costs by 
the economic or statistical analysis of available data. An example 
of this technique would be the determination of the cost of job 
discrimination. Another valuation technique is the use of the cost 
of production by the seller to determine its value to the user. The 
outlay cost is an extremely questionable technique, as it assumes an 
equality of value between buyer and seller that may not exist. 
2.5 Attempts at Social Reporting 
Although the practice of social reporting has proven difficult, 
/ o 
several studies have attempted to delineate specific methods. Beams4 
extended the traditional financial statement to include a mechanism 
for reporting environmental pollution. The accounting procedure sug¬ 
gested was a modification of the traditional depreciation charge with 
a debit to an expense account and a credit to a contra-asset account. 
The latter account reduced the value of the land account to its 
deteriorated value. Reclamation of a previously damaged environment 
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was accounted for by a reduction in the contra-asset account, a 
procedure similar to the accounting for extraordinary repairs to 
fixed assets. Although this technique has limited relevance and 
its worth is difficult to verify, it was one of the early attempts 
at solving the problem of recording corporate social action. 
/ O 
The subject of pollution was also studied by Marlin. J 
Rather than suggesting accounting procedures as Beams did. Marlin 
dealt with the difficulty in determining and quantifying the areas 
to be reported. One approach suggested was comparison in either 
tabular or narrative form of company controls with state-of-the-art 
standards established by committees within either the industry or 
the accounting profession. The second approach was to make a compari¬ 
son between pollutant emission figures for the firm and appropriate 
industrv standards. 
•/ 
Marlin’s reporting technique was extended by Dilley and 
Weygandt^ to include an occupational health and safety statement, 
equal employment opportunity information, and minority recruitment 
and promotion. This information was already largely being prepared 
by the firm in documents whose submission was required by the 
federal government. Due to the lack of standards in these additional 
areas when the article was prepared, the statements that were given 
lacked comparative figures. It was suggested that standards be dis¬ 
closed where applicable. The reports prepared in this study were 
nonfinancial except for monetary costs in such areas as pollution. 
One further statement similar to the Statement of Changes in 
Financial Position was suggested for disclosing financial information 
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previously disclosed either in narrative form in the financial 
statement or in reports prepared for governmental agencies. 
Corcoran and Leininger^ extended the reporting scheme of Dilley 
and Weygandt to include additional reporting areas as well as 
increasing the detail in the subjects already reported. Because 
of a perceived lack of a common denominator for assigning values, 
no attempt was made to quantify the report with financial measures. 
The Environmental Exchange Report prepared by Corcoran and 
Leininger included information on both inputs and outputs in such 
areas as the human, physical, and financial resources of the firm. 
Human inputs included all areas of employee information excluding 
wages paid and employee terminations. Inputs in the production 
process were disclosed in the report as well as the resultant outputs, 
including both marketable products and waste. The financial portion 
of this report includes the traditional funds flow statement modified 
to include detailed disclosure of taxes paid, voluntary contributions 
made by the firm, investments made for pollution control and environ¬ 
mental improvement, and financial aid extended to social causes. 
A more comprehensive statement which includes financial 
measures is the Socio-Economic Operating Statement of Linowes.^ 
This statement provides for disclosure of corporate social action 
in the following three areas: (1) people-related activities such as 
expenditure on employee welfare; (2) environment-related activities 
such as pollution abatement or environment—related activities; and 
(3) product-related activities such as consumer and product safety. 
The contents of this report were limited to expenditures made 
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voluntarily by the firm. As such, expenditures forced on the firm 
by government fiat or legal sanction were not disclosed. The total 
of the improvements for a year were added to the net amount of such 
improvements from the activities reported in previous years. 
The value of any socially beneficial actions of which manage¬ 
ment was aware but had elected not to make, as well as any legally 
required actions that the firm had not taken, would be netted against 
the positive actions. The determination of the value of these detri¬ 
ments is highly subjective and may lack verifiability. By measuring 
the cost avoided, other costs to society as a whole which may be 
incurred by the lack of action may be excluded. According to Estes,^ 
one of the advantages of this approach is that a socially responsible 
firm has a better earnings figure than a socially irresponsible firm 
when the Socio-Economic Operating Statement is coupled with the 
traditional income statement. 
Abt^ has produced a comprehensive set of social financial 
statements for his firm. Of the social audit on which these statements 
are based, Bauer has said it 
. . . is distinctive in many ways. It is the only instance 
in which the completed audit corresponded to a prior 
programatic statement of what an audit should be; it is 
the only completed audit that measures social costs and 
benefits in monetarized terms; it is the most expeditiously 
completed of any audit with more than very modest pretension; 
it is the only audit of a small company; and it is the only 
one in which the chief executive officer (with one possible 
exception) was the driving force.^ 
The social financial statements of Abt Associates, Inc. employ a 
framework that accents the social disclosures while assuming the same 
basic form as conventional statements. The Social and Financial 
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Balance Sheet is divided into disclosures about Social Assets, 
Social Liabilities and Social Equity. The relationship of these 
elements is the same as that on a conventional balance sheet. 
Social Assets include the staff, the organization, the general public 
and community, and the stockholders. Notable aspects of the dis¬ 
closures of social assets include a contra-asset entitled. Accumulated 
Training Obsolescence, which reduces the Investment in Training of the 
staff. The difference between public services covered by taxes paid 
by the company and those services consumed is considered an asset 
supplied to the general public and community. The stockholders’ 
section of this statement is identical to the conventional balance 
sheet. 
Included under Social Liabilities is an account equal to the 
staff assets which are contingent on the future performance of the 
staff, organizational financing requirements, and the firm’s liabili¬ 
ties to the general public and community of accumulated environmental 
pollution caused by the operations of the company.^ 
The Social and Financial Income Statement discloses the 
difference between social benefits and social costs as Net Social 
Income. Once again the benefits and costs are broken down by the 
same suppliers of social resources as the balance sheet. Social 
benefits are economic resources generated by company operations 
which have a positive impact or add to society’s resources. Social 
costs are resources consumed by the firm or detrimental to society. 
The statements are supplemented by extensive notes describing in 
detail the activities summarized by the monetary figures. 
One of the most comprehensive statements is Seidler's Social 
Income Statement. Whereas Abt combines his Social Income Statement 
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with the traditional income statement, Seidler computes a net 
social gain or loss from his Social Income Statement and then 
amends this to the traditional income statement. 
Social profits disclosed by the firm are those socially 
desirable outputs for which no money is received by the firm. This 
includes employee information as well as any positive environmental 
or product actions taken. Subtracted from this total are all costs 
that the firm imposes on society but does not pay for. Discriminatory 
practices and environmental damage, for instance, would be disclosed 
in this section. 
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The Comprehensive Social Benefit/Cost Model of Estes takes 
the previous statement and increases it breadth to include social 
benefits for which monetary compensation is received and social costs 
for which money is expended. The computational model upon which 
Estes’ Social Impact Statement is based takes this form: 
N 00 B. M °° C. 
SS = I l - l l -^-jT 
i=l t=l (1+r) j=l t=i (1+r) 
Where 
SS = social surplus or benefit r = an appropriate discount rate 
B. = the i’th social benefit t = time period in which benefit 
C = the i’th social cost or cost is expected to occur 
J 
The social benefits disclosed in the Social Impact Statement 
include such areas as products and services provided, payments to other 
segments of society including employees, suppliers, stockholders, 
creditors, and governmental agencies in the form of taxes. 
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Corporations that donate services of their staff or equip¬ 
ment to a charitable, social or community organization or allow 
their facilities to be used by such an outside group disclose 
their actions as a social benefit. 
Environmental benefits such as restoration of previously 
damaged areas as well as any other socially beneficial corporate 
actions are also detailed in this section. 
Fringe benefits to employees are shown under the classifi¬ 
cation Additional Direct Employees Benefits. 
Social costs disclosed are expenditures in comparable areas 
to those previously discussed. All acquisitions made by the firm of 
raw materials used in production, fixed assets, or human resources 
are included as social costs. The reason for including these 
expenditures is the economic principle of opportunity cost. 
In addition to employee salaries are costs incurred in 
discrimination and work-related injuries and illness wThich should 
be disclosed under separate items. The corporation uses public 
services such as fire and police protection as well as public 
facilities such as roadw7avs. Estimates of the amounts of usage of 
these facilities are considered as a social cost and should be dis¬ 
closed as such. Moreover, any environmental damage done by the 
corporation or its employees must be evaluated and disclosed. 
Although monetary receipts such as interest paid on overdue 
accounts or on corporate savings accounts and stock purchases by 
investors are not considered a cost in the traditional sense (since 
the payments made to the corporation deny the payer the ability to 
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utilize the money elsewhere), these receipts are considered a social 
cost in the Estes mode]. Indirect effects that are difficult to 
quantify are disclosed in footnotes to the statement. This state¬ 
ment suffers, as have many in the past, from a lack of verifiability 
and from difficulty in quantifying the disclosures. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants^^ 
(A.I.C.P.A.) has proposed both an ideal system of social reporting 
and an initially practical system. The ideal system would be based 
on quantitative measurement of any impacts that the firm has on the 
quality of life in all segments of society. The measurement in this 
system would either be made immediately using a single unit of measure¬ 
ment or be capable of conversion into such a unit. This ideal system 
is almost impossible to develop because of the difficulty of attaining 
a common unit of measure. In addition, it would be difficult to 
determine the point at which the action of the firm no longer is 
responsible for a situation existing in the firm’s environment. 
Frequently there exists a "domino effect" in interrelationships 
that would make a determination of the actual impact of the firm 
virtually impossible. 
Given the difficulties of developing the ideal system, the 
A.I.C.P.A. proposed an initial system which made the suggested 
reporting scheme possible to implement. Social reporting in this 
initial system is restricted to "significant actions and impacts 
affecting areas of primary social concern.'In addition, measure¬ 
ment is made only of actions deemed to be indicative of the totality 
of the actions and the impacts made by the firm. 
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The units of measurement used will be diverse and, where no 
quantitative measurement is possible, a narrative form is permissible. 
Additional simplifications of the ideal are suggested, such as 
replacing the assessment of impact on the quality of human life 
with the measurement of the impact on social conditions which may, 
in turn, affect human life. Where the ideal type of measure still 
eludes the reporter, that measurement is replaced by an attempt to 
measure the actions of the firm and their results. 
The A.I.C.P.A.’s initial system can be implemented and is 
similar to some of the comprehensive attempts outlined earlier. 
Perhaps more significant is this system’s proposal by an organiza¬ 
tion which represents the practicing professionals in the accounting 
field and also influences the requirements for financial reporting. 
A study by Stiner^^ concerning the attitudes of certified 
public accountants towards social disclosure revealed results that 
are contrary to the model proposed by the A.I.C.P.A. A majority of 
the C.P.A.’s questioned felt there was no need for companies to 
develop an information system to report corporate social behavior. 
Less than half the professionals questioned felt that corporate social 
performance should be measured in numerical and descriptive terms, 
features of both the initial and ideal A.I.C.P.A. systems. However, 
both the A.I.C.P.A. system and the Stiner study indicated the areas 
of social reporting should include community involvement, human 
resources, physical resources and environmental contributions and 
product or service contributions. Therefore, it appears that there 
is a difference in the perceived need for a social information system 
between the A.I.C.P.A. and the practitioners it represents. 
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2.6 The Process Audit 
Given the acknowledged difficulty in obtaining corporate 
social action measures which will be reliable enough to withstand 
an audit and capable of independent attestation, Bauer and Fenn^ 
and Linowes-^ (1975) advocate the use of a process audit to fill 
the void in social reporting. The proposed process audit consists 
of five steps. 
The first step is to identify the social activity. It is 
necessary to define the scope of the activity in sufficient detail to 
separate it from all other related activities. The next step in the 
process is to assess the circumstances under which the social program 
came into being. If the program is government-mandated, it is possible 
that it was implemented involuntarily. Such factors can affect the 
evaluations made in the next several audit steps. 
The social activity must then be compared to a standard, for 
which it is necessary to indicate the goals of the program identified 
in the first step. In order to facilitate verifiability and make a 
detailed comparison, a clear, concise statement must be made which 
described the activity’s goals and objectives. In some cases, the 
social program that the firm has enacted is a multi-step plan that 
will ultimately lead to fulfilling the goals outlined in the previous 
step. Therefore, the next step in the process audit is to give a 
statement of the theory behind the goal stated earlier. This should 
include an indication of how the goals will be attained (the final 
result of the multi-step procedure) and the reasons the proposed 
actions will be used to achieve the goals (where they fit in the plan). 
36 
It is, therefore, possible for the user of the statement to determine 
exactly where the firm stands in relation to its goals and how long 
it may take to reach them. The last step in the process audit is 
for the firm to describe what actions it is really taking as opposed 
to what should ideally be done. This statement should include any 
measures of performance that are available. A comparison of the 
ideal and the actual can give the statement user an indication of the 
success or failure of the firm in meeting its goals; i.e., a variance 
report. 
This chapter discussed the history of corporate social reporting 
by U.S. corporations, looking specifically at the models and techniques 
that have appeared in the literature for reporting and the reasons why 
corporations are at their present level of reporting. 
Chapter Three will concentrate on the research design, discuss 
research concerning the effect of corporate social actions on the 
investor, and discuss the statistical methods to be used in the 
analysis of the results of this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the hypotheses that were tested and the 
research design that was followed in conducting the experiment. The 
first section provides definitions of the terms used in the study. This 
is considered necessary because there are many different definitions 
available for many of the terms. The next section defines the general 
hypotheses to be tested as well as the operational hypotheses that will 
be tested to verify General Hypothesis Number 1. The next section des¬ 
cribes the development of the stimulus materials, the selection of the 
corporations, and the employment of resultant financial ratios and so¬ 
cial responsibility information. Explanations follow of the administra¬ 
tion of both the initial and the revised instruments. The concluding 
section describes the statistical analysis that was conducted on the 
results obtained from the administration of the revised instrument. 
3.1 Definitions 
The following terms and phrases are used repeatedly in this 
study and, hence, are defined to provide a common terminology: 
Social. "All aspects of a corporation’s activities that impinge 
upon (a) the economic future of the whole society or world as far as 
this can be separated from that of the corporate future and (b) all 
corporate activities that directly or indirectly affect human values 
and are not found in traditional accounts. 
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Corporate policies affect human health and well-being far 
beyond the company's immediate justification for its expenditures 
on those policies. For example, training a member of a minority group 
in a skill may affect that person and his/her family for generations, 
the public welfare system, and the community. Training and education 
may have the following effects which do not appear in the accounts: 
(1) increasing the person's self-esteem and self-confidence; 
(2) providing a role model for other minority members, especially 
children in the family; 
(3) enhancing the person's position in the community; 
(4) decreasing the welfare rolls. 
Social responsibility. "The objectives or motives that should 
be given weight by business in addition to those dealing with economic 
performance. 
Assuming that the economic state of a corporation is reflected 
in its Income Statement, a corporation's social activities are 
considered those that either (1) reduce its profits or that (2) do 
not directly lead to profit making (such as lending of meeting 
facilities to civic organizations). 
Generally accepted accounting principles prescribe that 
financial statements document corporate activities which are measur¬ 
able in monetary units. The increased emphasis on the disclosure of 
corporate activities that defy quantitative measurement may compel 
the accounting profession to adopt broader disclosure requirements. 
This is especially important in the earlier years of corporate social 
reporting when disclosure tends to be descriptive. Quantitative 
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aspects develop later as standards are devised with which to compare 
the corporate activities. 
Socially responsible corporation. "The company whose top 
management has decided that it should be or must be responsible in 
some way to the new demands placed upon business by the society in 
O 
which it operates." 
This definition implies that some degree of corporate planning 
occurs before socially responsible actions are taken. However, this 
is often not the case. Instead, pressure from the various communities 
with which the organization interacts forces the firm to act. 
Social accounting. "Means of improving the social performance 
of a corporation"^ by "generating the information"^ necessary to 
"develop a broad measurement of what is happening to the quality of 
life."^ Social accounting is "concerned with the social, human, 
and environmental constraints on organizational behavior."'7 
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Of the several reporting systems discussed in Chapter 2, only 
the Marlin (1973) report format attempts to compare the degree of 
activity with a standard and to derive a variance. 
Likewise, most corporations report their activities while 
failing to indicate the target level they are striving to attain. 
This renders it questionable whether the corporation has any such goal 
in mind. 
Social audit. "(1) the developemnt of information about the 
social impacts of a company's present actions, (2) the establishment 
g 
of objectives, plans and standards of desired social performance. 
(3) "the assessment of any and all corporate activities that have an 
impact on society" followed by (4) "attestation of the veracity 
of information generated by social accounting. 
According to the definition the social audit is more far- 
reaching than the attestation audit, since the former includes dis¬ 
cussions of desired future performance as well as analysis and 
attestation of what has already been done. Accordingly, the indepen¬ 
dent auditor will not want to become involved in such an undertaking. 
Moreover, social statements will involve discussions of costs and 
benefits that are unquantifiable and are, thus, exceedingly difficult 
to verify. Moreover, to achieve a social audit, the firm may have 
to sacrifice attestation. 
3.2 Research Question 
This section describes the hypotheses to be investigated in 
the study. 
Hypothesis Number 1: The inclusion of corporate social 
responsibility information with corporate financial informa¬ 
tion will result in investment decisions by the individual 
investor which differ from those made in the absence of 
such information. 
Contradictory evidence exists as to the importance placed on social 
information by users of financial statements. A study by Longstreth 
and Rosenbloom^ has shown institutional investors to be knowledgeabl 
about the social policies of the firms in which they held investments 
The study further revealed attempts by these investors to influence 
corporate social policy. 
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Whereas this study dealt with investment holdings, the 
reported influence of social information on the original investment 
decision appears negligible. Benjamin and Stanga-*-^ found that bankers 
and financial analysts attributed little importance to social responsi¬ 
bility information in their decision-making. Moreover, Buzby and 
Falk found that the majority of university financial officers involved 
in institutional investment did not consider negative social informa¬ 
tion important in their decision-making. 
These studies appear to indicate that social responsibility 
information by the institutional investor may be a product of invest¬ 
ment holdings and may not be a factor in the initial investment 
decision. 
The study by Longstreth and Rosenbloom has revealed that 57.4% 
of their institutional respondents took social considerations into 
account when choosing their investment. In addition, 27.8% of the 
investors adopted policies which excluded certain types of firms as 
investment opportunities.^ This study intends to ascertain the 
existence of such social awareness on the part of persons who have or 
are currently making similar investment decisions either for themselves 
or their corporate employer. Such awareness should be manifested in 
a reluctance to invest in firms reporting behavior detrimental to 
society. 
To test Hypothesis Number 1, the following operational 
hypotheses will be examined: 
Operational Hypothesis 1: The individual investor will invest 
less money in a forced investment situation in firms reporting 
negative social responsibility information than in firms 
reporting no social responsibility information. 
A person possessing social awareness should be willing to 
reward the firm that reports positive social action by investing 
more money in the firm than he/she would if no such information was 
revealed. The reporting of predominantly positive social information 
in corporate annual reports^ may indicate that reporting corporations 
perceived positive revelations as a competitive advantage. The increase 
in the frequency of such reporting^ may mean that firms feel that 
disclosing positive information diminishes the advantage of their 
competitors who already disclose such information and will encourage 
investment by the socially aware investor. 
Operational Hypothesis 2: The individual investor will 
invest more money in a forced investment situation in 
firms reporting positive social responsibility information 
than in firms reporting no social responsibility information. 
The second hypothesis is intended to determine if there are 
similarities in the criteria the ’’educated investor” uses in the 
allocation of resources for investment. 
Hypothesis Number 2: There exists a predictor function that 
will estimate the amount of money invested in a company by 
the investor as a function of the importance placed on the 
financial information on which the decision is based. 
3.3 Development of Stimulus Materials 
3.3.1 Selection of financial ratios. The financial ratios selected 
for use as independent variables in the test instrument were suggested 
to be critical ratios in Jensen’s Studies in Accounting Research if 14^ 
(see Exhibit 1). In addition to the ratios included in the instrument, 
several contained in Study #14 were excluded due to an inability to 
determine their equations. This may have been due to their relative 
Earnings per share 
Dividends per share 
Book value 
Price-earnings 
Earnings margin 
Net earnings to net working capital 
Return on common equity 
Return on net worth before depreciation and taxes 
Return on total capital 
Return on total capital before depreciation and taxes 
Net sales per dollar of total capital 
Net sales per dollar of common equity 
Current ratio 
Ratio of common equity to total capital 
Acid test ratio 
Sales growth 
Earnings growth 
Sales to common equity at market 
Earnings to common equity at market 
Dividend yield 
Net assets to common equity at market 
Net sales to inventory 
Fixed assets to tangible net worth 
Percentage of earnings paid on common equity 
Ratio of common Equity to total liabilities 
Exhibit 1. Financial Ratios Selected for Use 
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obscurity as financial ratios or to differences in terminology 
between Jensen and the finance and accounting literature consulted. 
3.3.2 Selection of corporations. The corporations selected for 
inclusion in the instrument were Fortune 500 Industrials for the 
year 1977. Companies were considered pairs if they had a measure of 
systemic risk that differed by less than ten percent (10%). Quarterly 
per share dividend information and stock prices at the end of each 
quarter for the years 1970-77 were used in determining systemic risk. 
3.3.3 Calculation and placement of ratios. The ratios were calculated 
from information contained in annual reports and 10-K filings for the 
year 1977 and were selected in random order for placement on the 
instrument. After the initial administration of the instrument, the 
number of independent variables was reduced to nine, including the 
social responsibility information. For inclusion in this instrument, 
(• 
ratios were required to possess (1) indicated importance by more than 
one subject in the initial administration or (2) inclusion in at least 
two of the three leading financial information publications (Standard 
and Poor's, Moody’s Industrials, and Value Line Investment Survey) 
in the year 1977. Ratios meeting the two criteria are listed in 
Exhibit 2. The random ordering previously determined was maintained 
in this instrument. 
3.3.4 Selection of social responsibility information. The social 
responsibility information on the instrument was arranged so that each 
potential investor was in the control group for one pair of firms. 
Dividends per Share 
Earnings Growth 
Earnings Margin 
Earnings per Share 
Gross Margin 
Price Earnings Ratio 
Return on Net Worth Before 
Depreciation and Taxes 
Sales Growth 
Exhibit 2. List of Financial Ratios 
Used in Final Survey 
Instrument 
Table 1 indicates the types of social information received by each 
group of subjects. Several of the social responsibility disclosures 
were found in annual reports or 10-K filings of corporations used 
in this study. The remainder were fictional. Exhibit 3 lists 
the disclosures given to the subjects in this study. The types of 
social responsibility information used in the instrument can be 
found in Table 2. 
Corporations are increasingly being called upon to carry out 
philanthropic and charitable work to help meet their social responsi 
bilities in the community. Corporate responses include the matching 
of the alumni/alumnae gifts of employees to institutions of higher 
education, the endowment of educational positions, and monetary 
support of such organizations as the United Way. Disclosures of 
the type made by TWA to the Council on Economic Priorities are 
indicative of charitable involvement: 
TWA has no foundation. However, the company’s contributions 
totalled four percent of yearly income before taxes in 1969. 
In 1971 TWA’s contributions totalled $150,000, of which 75-80 
percent went to the United Fund and 20 percent to charitable ^ 
institutions such as hospitals, etc. in the Kansas City area. 
The disclosure by corporations of their involvement in the 
communities in which they operate take various forms. Some of these 
such as the sponsoring of local youth sport teams, are good for 
public relations, while others, such as the anonymous donations over 
many years to urban neighborhood improvement recently disclosed by 
Levi-Strauss, provide no direct advantage except as a tax deduction. 
Such activities also produce tangential benefits such as better 
neighborhoods in which plants can locate and employees reside. 
51 
TABLE 1 
TYPES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INFORMATION SUPPLIED 
TO EACH GROUP OF SUBJECTS 
Firs: 
Group AB CD EF GH JK 
1 0 0 0 0 + 0 - + 0 
2 + 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 - 
3 0 — + 0 0 0 _ 0 r 0 + 
A 0 + 0 - + 0 0 0 - 0 
5 - 0 0 + 0 - + 0 0 0 
0 = no social responsibility information 
+ = positive social responsibility information 
- = negative social responsibility information 
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Company 
Type of 
Information Information 
Monetary 
Amount 
A Positive 
« 
Cost of products donated to charity $ 5,000 
A Negative Cost of cleaning up air pollution 50,000 
B Positive Cost of training program for the 
disadvantaged 75,000 
B Negative Fines levied on officers charged 
with buying stock using inside 
knowledge 175,000 
C Positive Loss due to divestiture of invest¬ 
ment in South Africa 15,000 
C Negative Fine for illegal campaign contri¬ 
butions 75,000 
D Positive Paid full salaries to personnel 
working in community projects 230,000 
D Negative F.D.A. forced withdrawal of 
product from market 300,000 
E Positive Donated money to community for 
urban renewal . 500,000 
E Negative Invested in plant in South Africa 400,000 
F Positive Cost of installing pollution 
control devices 40,000 
F Negative Punitive fines in discrimination 
suit 60,000 
G Positive Cost of reclaiming land that was 
strip-mined 180,000 
G Negative Reimbursement of employees for 
previous descriminatory salary 
schedule 15,000 
Exhibit 3. Type of Social Responsibility Information and Monetary 
Amount Reportedly Spent Given to Treatment Groups. 
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Company 
H 
H 
J 
J 
K 
K 
Exhibit 
Type of 
Information Information 
Monetary 
Amount 
Positive Cost of cleaning up effluent 
discharged into river $ 85,000 
Negative Illegal employee bonuses 565,000 
Positive Cost of child care services 
for employees 105,000 
Negative Fine for exceeding noise 
pollution standards 10,000 
Positive Cost of revitalizing and ex¬ 
panding production facilities 
in an older metropolitan area 750,000 
Negative Fine for selling unsafe product 450,000 
. Type of Social Responsibility Information and Monetary 
Amount Reportedly Spent Given to Treatment Groups (cont.)- 
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TABLE 2 
TYPES OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INFORMATION USED 
IN THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
Positive Negative 
Information Information 
Charitable Donation 1 0 
Community Involvement 4 0 
Illegalities 0 3 
International Involvement 1 1 
Pollution 3 2 
Quality of Product Produced 0 2 
Relations with Personnel 1 2 
Total 
1 
4 
3 
2 
5 
2 
3 
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Companies have also demonstrated their community involvement 
through their investments and patronage in minority-owned ventures 
and through their sponsorship of minority students. 
The Dana Corporation’s 1977 annual reports indicates that the 
company provided time off for its employees which allowed them to 
participate in civic affairs. Dana also offered its company facili¬ 
ties for meetings.^ in 1977 McDonald-Douglass aided in a collection 
20 
effort of food and Christmas gifts for the needy. Other areas of 
corporate involvement included community health (disclosed by Norton- 
21 
Simon),'- the education of school drop-outs and prison inmates 
?? 23 
(Honeywell), L and support of the arts (Occidental Petroleum). 
Reports of corporate wrongdoing hardly make for flattering 
corporate disclosures. Frequently, revelations of such actions are 
initially made by the media and later substantiated by the corporations. 
Recent illegal activities include price-fixing, illegal political cam¬ 
paign contributions, and bribery of foreign governmental officials to 
obtain business. 
The disclosure of involvement by U.S. multinational corporations 
in countries whose political and/or social policies are unpopular with 
numbers of the U.S. citizenry can lead to attempts by citizens to 
change corporate policies. Corporations doing business in South 
Africa, whose apartheid policies are not popularly supported in the 
U.S., are increasingly subject to stockholder actions, boycotts, and 
protests. 
Results of the 1978 Ernst and Ernst survey indicate that the 
amount of corporate disclosure on corporate impact on the environment 
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may be decreasing. This may not indicate a decline in the importance 
of this issue but rather compliance with E.P.A. regulations. Litiga¬ 
tion resulting from failure to comply may not appear in this study. 
An example of positive environmental disclosure is Westvaco’s 
1977 reporting of pollution control: 
Westvaco's accumulated investment has risen to $97 million 
for construction of environmental installations, and as 
part of our growth program we have earmarked at least 
another $45 million for environmental protection.25 
Corporations that damage the land while doing business (such 
as mining and oil exploration ventures) have disclosed land reclama- 
2 6 
tion procedures (e.g., Gulf Oil’s land reclamation and the oil 
27 
spill prevention program of Texaco disclosed in 1977 ). 
Resource recycling is assuming increasing importance as 
corporations act to preserve scarce resources. In its 1977 annual 
report, IBM disclosed its recycling of water, precious metals, produc- 
28 * 
tion wastes, and packaging materials. During the same yeat, Adolph 
29 
Coors disclosed an aluminum can recycling program. 
The reputation of a firm's products may be influenced more 
by media disclosure of product recalls than by disclosures in corpo¬ 
rate annual reports. The increasing public concern with consumer 
safety has led to the recall of everything from possibly defective 
automobiles and airplanes to hairdryers and tires. These actions 
may result from either corporate initiative or from federal inter¬ 
vention when corporations refuse to take action themselves. In some 
cases the government may not remove the product from use but instead 
file suit for violating safety laws. 
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An example of a positive product safety disclosure is found 
in Standard Oil of California's 1977 annual report: 
During 1977, we conducted 145 experimental toxicology 
studies to identify and evaluate potential health 
hazards . . .30 
Other safety disclosures in 1977 reports included developments 
in packaging for iodine and other unstable compounds to protect against 
31 
leakage by R.J. Reynolds Industries, and the development of products 
32 
containing no fluorocarbons by Talley Industries. 
The success of a business venture can be greatly influenced 
by the way the organization treats its employees. As a result, firms 
are increasingly emphasizing programs for employees that benefit the 
firm indirectly. An increasing concern with the health and safety 
of employees is reflected in teh following 1977 annual report dis¬ 
closures : 
Occupational medical services are available to monitor 
closely the health of employees. (Air Products & 
Chemical)33 
The Company continued a high-priority program to 
assure that work places are safe from exposure to toxic 
substances and hazardous conditions. (Phillips Petro¬ 
leum) 34 
Lower employee productivity can result from problems other 
than those stemming form the safety of the workplace. The 1977 annual 
report for International Telephone and Telegraph described a program 
to combat these problems: "The program offers counselling and assis¬ 
tance on alcoholism as well as a full range of emotionally based 
35 
problems." Concern for the employees is also reflected in the 
36 
advancement of women and minorities (T.R.W.), employment of the 
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handicapped (International Telephone and Telegraph), ^7 Vietnam 
38 
veterans (Bristol-Myers), and in-house educational programs in 
39 
both job-related and other fields (Tektronix). 
The seven areas of disclosure used in the instrument are 
currently found in corporate annual reports and, thus, represent 
information upon which investors may be evaluating investment 
opportunities. 
3.4 Selection of the Subjects 
Written correspondence was undertaken with several profes¬ 
sional organizations whose members were thought to consist of 
"reasonably well-informed as well as sophisticated users''^ of 
accounting information. In addition, these people were thought to 
be in corporate positions which indicated either job-related or 
private investment experience. Since the members of these organiza¬ 
tions were mostly males (according to research by Lewellan^-*-) , they 
should be more likely not to rely on others for help in formulating 
investment decisions. 
3.5 Initial Administration of the Instrument 
The initial administration of the instrument was conducted 
at a dinner meeting of the Springfield, Massachusetts Chapter of the 
Financial Executives Institute. This organization’s members are 
predominantly corporate financial officers. After a brief explana¬ 
tion of the purpose of the study, the subjects received the instrument 
along with a cover letter and a self-addressed, stamped envelope 
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for mail return. Twenty-seven instruments were distributed. 
The subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to 
determine the types of financial information that influenced invest¬ 
ment decision-making. They were not told about the social responsi¬ 
bility information on the instrument or of the actual hypothesis 
being tested. After one month, four completed forms were returned. 
No follow-up contact with the subjects was possible, as the researcher 
was refused access to the list of attendees at the meeting. Comments 
made on the returned forms indicated that the instrument was too long. 
As indicated in the previous section, the instrument was then shortened. 
3.6 Administration of the Revised Instrument 
The revised instrument was administered twice (see Appendix I). 
It was first administered at a dinner meeting of the Pioneer Valley 
Chapter of the National Association of Accountants. This organization 
is comprised of people working in corporate accounting. After a brief 
explanation of the purpose of the research, the instrument was distri¬ 
buted and completed by the subjects. A total of thirty-nine (39) 
responses were obtained. The same procedure was used in administering 
the instrument at a dinner meeting of the Northeast Connecticut Chapter 
of the Institute of Internal Auditors. This organization is comprised 
primarily of corporate auditors. Thirty-nine (39) additional responses 
were obtained. The seventy-eight (78) responses were deemed sufficient 
for application of the statistical analyses. 
Several responses to specific pairs of firms were later elimi¬ 
nated from the analysis because either the amounts invested failed 
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to total $10,000 or the points allocated to the independent variables 
failed to total one hundred. As Seen in Table 3, the acceptable 
responses totaled between 69 and 71. These amounts were still deemed 
significant for statistical analysis. 
3.7 Statistical Analysis 
Several statistical techniques from the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences were used to test the study's hypotheses. The 
Frequencies Subprogram was run on the data of each response group in 
order to obtain the one-way frequency distribution tables and summary 
statistics used in the interpretation of other test results. 
3.7.1 Test of Hypothesis Number 1. In order to test the signifi¬ 
cance of any differences in the response rates by the subjects of 
the control group with those of treatment groups for each pair 
of companies. Student’s t-test was run on the data. For this test, 
the mean difference between two independent samples (the control 
group and one treatment group) were compared for the single independent 
variable and the eight dependent variables. 
Further verification of the results of Student's t-test was 
obtained by running a regression on the data using a dummy-coded 
variable to denote the presence or absence of social responsibility 
information. The results of this regression took the form 
Yi ■ AIXI + Vs + Vv 
Where is the differential intercept variable 
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Xg is the differential slope variable 
Xy measured the importance of the variable exclusive of 
the impact of social responsibility information. 
By examining the statistical significance of the coefficient 
of the differential intercept variable, it was possible to assess the 
difference in the number of dollars invested in the first company of 
each pair by the control group and a treatment group. Analysis of 
the slope coefficient indicated a comparison of the variability of 
the average amount invested in the first company of a pair by the 
control group and a treatment group. 
3.7.2 Tests of Hypothesis Number 2. To test for the existence of 
the descriptive function hypothesized in Hypothesis Number 2, the 
Kendall's tau test was administered. This test was chosen over others 
that summarize the strength of association between variables of the 
control and experimental groups because (1) it does not depend on a 
normal distribution of the data as does the Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation and (2) it is superior to the Spearman's rho test in the 
handling of tied rankings. 
To further test for the descriptive function, a multiple 
regression was run on each group of responses. 
The function resulting from this test took the form 
Y = A1X1 + A2X2+ A3X3+ A4Xa+ A5X5+ A6X6+ A7X7+ AgXgH A?X9+ B 
where Y is the amount of dollars invested 
is the indicated importance of Dividends per Share 
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X2 is the indicated importance of Earnings Growth 
X3 is the indicated importance of Earnings Margin 
X^ is the indicated importance of Earnings per Share 
X5 is the indicated importance of Gross Margin 
Xg is the indicated importance of Price-Earnings Ratio 
Xy is the indicated importance of Return on Net Worth 
Xg is the indicated importance of Sales Growth 
Xg is the indicated importance of Social Responsibility 
Information 
Xg appeared in the regression for all groups but the control 
group. By examining the statistical significance of each independent 
variable in the regression equation, it was possible to determine the 
descriptive function that best described the investment function of 
the subjects. 
This chapter described the terms used throughout the research, 
the hypotheses that were tested, the development and administration of 
the research instrument, and the statistical analyses used to test the 
responses to the instrument. Chapter Four discusses the results of 
the statistical analyses used to test the hypotheses of this study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS- 
VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESIS NUMBER 1 
This chapter analyzes the results of the test instrument deve¬ 
loped in the previous chapter. Included in the discussion are the 
results of Student's t-test comparing the dependent variables of 
the control groups with those of the treatment groups and the eight 
independent variables of the control groups with their counterparts in 
the treatment groups. An additional test used to verify the results of 
Student's t-test and discussed in this chapter is a multiple 
regression analysis with a dummy variable to denote the presence or 
absence of social responsibility information. 
The results of these tests will be discussed by the type of 
social information presented to the individual investor and are found on 
Tables 35 and 36 in Appendix 2. 
4.1 Corporate charitable contributions. In recent years, corporations 
have exhibited a willingness to support the activities of charitable 
organizations. Such support took many forms such as the donation of 
products, services, or funds directly to organizations; the utilization 
of corporate facilities for organizational meetings; or the direct 
funding of such activities. 
The only social disclosure related to corporate charitable 
contributions given to the subjects of this study was the donation of 
products costing $5,000 to charity by Company A. The hypothesized 
67 
68 
investor reaction to such positive disclosure would be an increase in 
the amount invested in Company A. The results of Student's t-test 
and the multiple regression with a dummy variable failed to verify this 
hypothesis. In addition, there was no statistically significant change 
in the indicated importance of the independent variables under Student's 
t-test. Such lack of investor reaction may be due to the substantial 
discrepancy in the financial data presented for the two companies. 
The sole exception to the lack of investor response was the 
result of the multiple regression with a dummy-coded variable for the 
independent variable, Sales Growth. When potential investors considered 
this variable to be a highly important investment criterion, they 
invested significantly less (pj<.05) in Company A when they received the 
social information than when they did not receive such disclosure. This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. 
This phenomenon may be the result of the investor feeling the 
firm donated products for social purposes that could have been sold, 
thus decreasing the sales growth for the year. 
It may be theorized that the lack of statistically significant 
results was due to several characteristics of the data given to the 
subjects: 
(1) Corporate charitable contributions are sufficiently commonplace 
that their disclosure does not affect the investor; 
(2) The monetary value of the contribution was considered immaterial 
by the investor; 
(3) The substantial difference between the financial ratios for 
Companies A and B overrode the importance of the social disclo¬ 
sure. 
4.2 Pollution. The problem of pollution was one of the first areas 
10000 
Indicated importance of 
Sales Growth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 1. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Sales 
Growth and the amount invested in Company A. 
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of corporate social behavior to receive interest and legislation from 
all levels of government. Accordingly, pollution was one of the first 
areas in which corporate activities were disclosed. 
Although the concerns addressed by the original legislation may 
have been rectified and have been followed by the cessation of 
corresponding corporate disclosure, new areas of damage are being 
revealed which necessitate more governmental intervention and new cor¬ 
porate disclosure. Therefore, the disclosure of pollution-related 
social information continues to be made in corporate annual reports. 
The social information on pollution supplied to the potential 
investor in this study fell into four areas: 
Company Type of Information Information Monetary Disclosure 
A negative Cost of cleaning up 
air pollution 
$50,000 
F positive Cost of installing 
pollution control 
devices 
$40,000 
H positive Cost of cleaning up 
effluent discharged 
into river 
$85,000 
J negative Fine for exceeding 
noise pollution 
standards 
$10,000 
The expenditure of $50,000 to clean up air pollution produced 
no statistically significant change in the amount of money that the 
investor was willing to invest in Company A. However, the results of 
Student's t-test did reveal a statistically significant change in 
investment criteria. The independent variables Return on *<et Uorth 
significantly increased (p£. 10) in importance when the social infor- 
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mation was received. A corresponding decrease was found for Sales 
Growth (p_<. 10). Even excluding the outlying responses shown in Table 4, 
the means of the two sets of responses differ substantially. 
The change in investment criteria that occurred may be explained 
as a shift away from a growth measure toward a measure of immediate 
return to the potential investor. It appears that pollution-related 
expenses changed the investor-indicated criterion from one based on 
sales to an emphasis on earnings. Such a change provided a justifica¬ 
tion for the investor to remain with the same investment strategy in the 
face of differing information. 
When a firm took measures to prevent pollution, potential 
investors reacted differently than they did to the cleaning up of pollu¬ 
tion. The results of Student's t-test revealed a statistically signifi¬ 
cant increase in the amount invested in Company F (p_<. 10) in the 
presence of the social information. This verified the operational 
hypothesis that the presence of positive social information caused an 
increase in the amount invested in the company disclosing the infor¬ 
mation. The amounts invested are found in Table 5. The results of 
Student's t-test on the independent variables revealed a statistically 
significant increase in the importance of Earnings Growth (p£.02) as 
well as a decrease in Dividends per Share (pj(.05) and Earnings Margin 
(p<.10) in the presence of the positive social information. 
It can be conjectured that potential investors who did not 
receive any social information justified their investment decision by 
citing those financial ratios which were larger for Company E. The pre¬ 
sence of the information changed the investment strategy and shifted the 
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TABLE 4 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, 
RETURN ON NET WORTH AND SALES GROWTH WHEN COMPANY A 
DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE 
SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
RETURN ON NET WORTH SALES GROWTH 
without with without with 
Indicated social social social social 
Importance disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure 
0 7 3 7 8 
5 4 1 1 3 
10 2 1 3 1 
15 0 1 1 0 
20 1 3 2 0 
25 0 1 0 0 
30 1 1 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 
0 
70 0 0 1 
0 
75 0 0 0 
0 
80 0 1 0 
0 
Mean 6.00 18.75 10.67 
2.08 
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TABLE 5 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY F WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE 
SOCIAL INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY F 
Amount 
Invested ('✓)* 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 4 1 
500 0 0 
1000 0 0 
1500 0 0 
2000 2 1 
2500 0 0 
3000 1 2 
3500 0 0 
4000 1 1 
4500 0 0 
5000 2 2 
5500 0 0 
6000 1 1 
6500 0 0 
7000 2 0 
7500 1 2 
0000 1 0 
6500 0 0 
9000 0 0 
9500 0 0 
10000 0 4 
Mean 3766.67 5928.57 
*A of $10,000 had to be invested in either or both companies 
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important financial ratio to one in which Company F exceeded Company E. 
The change in criteria also reflected a shift from ratios based on 
current earnings to one based on an historical trend in earnings growth. 
The indicated importance of these independent variables is found in 
Table 6. 
Because the multiple regression with a dummy variable was con¬ 
ducted on the amount invested in the first company of each pair and 
because the amounts invested in the pairs of companies add to a fixed 
amount, the inverse of the sign of the y-intercept found on Table 36 in 
Appendix 2 will be taken when discussing relationships found for the 
second firm. The results of the multiple regression with a dummy 
variable further confirmed the results of Student's t-test for Company 
F. The potential investors who did not consider the independent 
variables Earnings per Share (p<^ 10), Gross Margin (p_<.01), and Return 
on Net Worth (p<•01) very important as decision-making criteria, 
invested significantly more in Company F when they received the infor¬ 
mation on the installation of a pollution control device than when they 
based their decision entirely on financial ratios. When the potential 
investors considered either of the latter two independent variables very 
important as decision-making criteria, they increased their investment 
in Company F significantly more in the presence of the social infor¬ 
mation than when they did not receive any such information. These rela¬ 
tionships are shown in Figures 2-4. As can be seen in Table 7, no 
potential investors considered either Gross Margin or Return on Net 
Worth as very important decision-making criteria. 
When the potential investors received information on the cost of 
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TABLE 6 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS GROWTH, DIVIDENDS 
PER SHARE AND EARNINGS MARGIN WHEN COMPANY F DISCLOSED 
NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE 
SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS GROWTH DIVIDENDS PER SHARE 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 7 2 2 6 
5 2 0 2 0 
10 4 4 1 4 
15 1 3 0 0 
20 1 2 3 3 
25 0 1 2 0 
30 0 1 2 1 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 1 0 0 
55 0 0 1 0 
60 0 0 1 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 1 0 
Mean 5.67 16.43 25.67 9.29 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
EARNINGS MARGIN 
without with 
Indicated social social 
Importance disclosure disclosure 
0 6 8 
5 1 2 
10 3 4 
15 2 0 
20 2 0 
25 0 0 
30 1 0 
35 0 0 
40 0 0 
45 0 0 
50 0 0 
55 0 0 
60 0 0 
65 0 0 
70 0 0 
75 0 0 
80 0 0 
Mean 9.00 3.57 
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Figure 2. Graphic presentation of the relation 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share and the amount invested in Company F 
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V 
Indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 4. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
s' .p .oe tween the investor-indicated import a nee of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company Y. 
so 
TABLE 7 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE GROSS MARGIN AND RETURN ON 
WRTH ¥HES COMPANY F DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION 
AND VISES POSITIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
GROSS MARGIN RETURN ON NET WORTH 
without with without with 
Indicated social social social social 
Importance disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
7 
2 
1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
6 
0 
7 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
1 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
6 
1 
4 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Mean 9.33 6.43 9.00 7.50 
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cleaning up a polluted river, they reacted as hypothesized by viewing 
this as a positive deed and by significantly increasing their invest¬ 
ments in Company H (p<..05). The amounts invested in Company H are shown 
in Table 8. The investment criteria used by the potential investors 
when they did not receive any social information were not changed by the 
receipt of the social information. 
It appears that the potential investors did not feel the amount 
of the difference in the financial ratios was large enough to justify 
their change in the investment amount. In addition, Table 9 reveals 
the importance attributed to the social information. The lack of sta¬ 
tistically significant changes in investment criteria may, in part, be 
due to the importance of the social information. 
The statistically significant change in investment amount found 
in Student’s t-test was further verified by the results of the multiple 
regression with a dummy variable for five independent variables. When 
the potential investor considered the independent variables Earnings 
Margin (p<^05), Earnings per Share, Sales Growth (p_<. 10), Earnings 
Growth (pj<.01) or Return on Net Worth (p_<.01) as minimally important as 
investment criteria, they invested significantly more in Company H when 
they received the social information than when no social information was 
provided. In addition, when the last two variables were considered 
important, the potential investors were willing to invest significantly 
more in Company H (p<.05) when the social disclosure was made than when 
they relied entirely on the financial ratios. These results are shown 
in Figures 5-9. 
As indicated in Table 10, none of the potential investors con- 
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TABLE 8 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY H WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL 
INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY H 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 6 3 
1000 1 0 
2000 1 0 
3000 0 2 
4000 0 0 
5000 3 3 
6000 0 0 
7000 0 1 
8000 1 0 
9000 0 1 
10000 1 5 
Mean 2769.23 5800.00 
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TABLE 9 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL INFORMATION 
WHEN COMPANY H DISCLOSED POSITIVE SOCIAL INFORMATION 
Indicated 
Importance 
SOCIAL INFORMATION 
with social 
disclosure 
0 11 
10 1 
20 2 
30 0 
40 0 
50 0 
60 0 
70 0 
80 0 
90 0 
100 1 
Mean 10.00 
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Figure 5. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Earn¬ 
ings Margin and the amount invested in Company H. 
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Figure 6. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Earn¬ 
ings per Share and the amount invested in Company H. 
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Figure 7. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Sales 
Growth and the amount invested in Company H. 
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Figure 8. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company H. 
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Figure 9. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company H. 
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TABLE 10 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS GROWTH AND RETURN 
ON NET WORTH WHEN COMPANY H DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS GROWTH RETURN ON NET WORTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 4 4 7 6 
5 1 0 1 1 
10 3 7 2 4 
15 2 1 0 0 
20 2 1 1 2 
25 1 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 1 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 1 2 0 
Mean 10.00 11.08 11.15 8.21 
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sidered either Karnings Growth or Return on Net Worth as very important 
in their decision-making processes. 
The payment of a fine for exceeding noise pollution standards 
did not generate any statistically significant investor reaction. The 
lack of change in the amount invested may be attributed to a lack of 
reaction to the imposition of fines. It may be theorized that the 
investor felt that the fine represented government "intervention"; was 
not something being done voluntarily and, hence, did not provide any 
reason to change either the amount invested or the investment criteria. 
In conclusion, several hypotheses have been raised in this 
section: 
(1) Potential investors utilize whatever ratios best support 
their investment pattern; 
(2) Positive corporate action on pollution prevention and 
abatement is rewarded but negative action is not punished; 
(3) Potential investors do not react to the payment of fines. 
4.3 Relations with personnel. Investor reaction to the disclosure of 
a firm's treatment of its employees may be caused by investor experien¬ 
ces outside the information supplied in the instrument. In addition to 
responses based on personal experiences, the reaction may be an index of 
the social awareness and feeling of the investor. 
The three personnel-related disclosures supplied in this instru¬ 
ment are shown below 
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Company Type of Information Information Monetary Disclosure 
F negative Punitive fines in $60,000 
discrimination suit 
G negative Reimbursement of $15,000 
employees for 
previous discrimina¬ 
tory salary schedule 
J positive Cost of child care $105,000 
services for 
employees 
The results of Student’s t-test for Company F revealed that 
the subjects did not change their investment strategy significantly 
when presented information on punitive fines resulting from a discrimi¬ 
nation suit. Apparently the adjudication of such a case, with the 
resulting implied guilt, did not evoke any reaction from people in the 
corporate sphere. Whether such employee treatment is considered too 
commonplace to evoke a reaction or the subjects were neutral towards the 
information is a matter of conjecture. 
Further analysis of the independent variables seemed to imply 
that the investment decision and criteria were not affected in any way 
by the expenditure of $60,000 in punitive fines. 
The lack of investor stimulation by disclosure of punitive fines 
was further verified by the results of the multiple regression with a 
dummy variable. Findings showed no statistically significant change in 
either the amount invested (y-intercept) or the interaction between the 
dummy-coded variable representing the presence of social responsibility 
information and independent variables (slope). It can be concluded, 
therefore, that fining a firm for discriminatory practices did not 
affect the actions or criteria used by the investor. 
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TABLE 11 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY G WHEN THE INVESTER RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE 
SOCIAL INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY G 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 1 2 
500 0 0 
1000 0 0 
1500 0 1 
2000 1 1 
2500 0 0 
3000 0 2 
3500 0 0 
4000 0 1 
4500 0 0 
5000 3 3 
5500 0 0 
6000 0 0 
6500 0 0 
7000 0 2 
7500 0 1 
8000 1 1 
8500 0 0 
9000 1 0 
9500 0 0 
10000 6 1 
Mean 7230.77 4533.33 
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TABLE 12 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO AND 
DIVIDENDS PER SHARE WHEN COMPANY G DISCLOSED NO 
SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO DIVIDENDS PER SHARE 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 1 5 7 2 
5 0 1 1 1 
10 0 1 2 2 
15 3 0 0 1 
20 1 1 3 2 
25 0 1 0 2 
30 2 1 0 1 
35 0 1 0 0 
40 0 2 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 3 1 0 2 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
65 0 1 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
75 1 0 0 1 
80 0 0 0 1 
85 0 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 0 
95 0 0 0 0 
100 2 0 0 0 
Mean 42.31 21.33 6.54 27.67 
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In addition to punitive fines for employee discrimination, firms 
may be required to reimburse employees for lost salaries. This is the 
nature of the negative social information disclosed by Company G. 
As seen in Table 11, the investor reacted to the disclosure of 
employee reimbursement for previous salary discrimination by reducing 
the amount invested in the company. This change in investment strategy 
was not an isolated reaction by a limited number of subjects but instead 
occurred across the investment spectrum. The result of Student’s t-test 
revealed that there was a true difference between the reaction of this 
group and those who did not receive social responsibility information 
(p<.05). This verifies the effect of negative social information 
hypothesized in Operational Hypothesis Number 1. 
It may be conjectured that the differences in the findings for 
Companies F and G may be a reaction to the personalization of the social 
information provided. A payment to the government apparently does not 
trigger the intensity of feeling that payments to people do. Another 
possible reason for the difference may be the differences in the finan¬ 
cial data, since the ratios of Company F were generally smaller than 
those of Company E, whereas those of Company G frequently exceeded 
Company H. Therefore, the effect of the social information on Company G 
appears even more germane to this study. 
The payment of $15,000 to employees as reimbursement for pre¬ 
vious salary inequities also resulted in a statistically significant 
change in the importance that subjects placed on the independent 
variables, Dividends per Share (p_<.01) and Price-Earnings Ratio (p<^ 10). 
Table 12 shows the distributions for these two independent variables. 
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Earnings Growth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 10. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company G. 
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Figure 11. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Margin and the amount invested in Company G. 
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Figure 12: Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Gross 
Margin and the amount invested in Company G. 
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Price-Earnings Ratio 
(points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 13. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Price- 
Earnings Ratio and the amount invested in Company G. 
Return on Net Worth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 14. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company G. 
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Figure 15. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Sales 
Growth and the amount invested in Company G. 
101 
The phenomenon that may have occurred was a change in emphasis from 
current earnings of the firm to return to the investor. Because of the 
magnitude of the difference between the Price-Earnings Ratios (4 to 1) 
and the Dividends per Share (.403 to 1) of Companies G and H, it may be 
tentatively concluded that many investors had no single investment stra¬ 
tegy but, rather, regarded financial information as important when they 
needed to justify their investment behavior. 
Operational Hypothesis Number 1 and the conclusions drawn from 
the results of Student’s t-test were further verified by the results 
of the multiple regression with a dummy variable. The amount invested 
in Company G in the regression of all the independent variables except 
Dividends per Share and Earnings per Share decreased enough to represent 
a pattern other than a chance occurrence. (See Table 36 for statistical 
significance.) In addition, subjects that attributed great importance 
to several of the independent variables increased their investment in 
firm G by a statistically significant amount in the presence of the 
social information than in its absence. The combined relationships took 
the form shown in Figures 10-15. 
In conclusion, the results of the statistical tests performed on 
the subject's responses when a fifteen thousand dollar reimbursement for 
salary inequities was disclosed verified the hypothesized effect of 
negative social disclosure on the individual investor. 
With women comprising an increasingly large proportion of the 
work force, childcare is becoming an increasing problem. The incurrence 
by Company J of a $105,000 childcare service cost may reflect 
childcare's future as an item of frequent disclosure in corporate annual 
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reports. 
A comparison of the amounts invested in Company J both with and 
without the expenditure on childcare services revealed no differences in 
subjects' investment patterns other than those that could occur by 
chance using both Student's t-test and the multiple regression with 
a dummy variable. 
It may be conjectured that the novelty of such corporate beha¬ 
vior resulted in a lack of investor reaction instead of the hypothesized 
increase in investment. 
Similarly, investor strategy showed no significant change bet¬ 
ween the two groups. It appears that investors overlook substantial 
monetary expenditures in personnel matters that traditionally fall out¬ 
side the corporate domain. 
The results of the multiple regression with a dummy variable 
revealed a statistically significant increase in the amount invested in 
Company J in the presence of the information by subjects that regarded 
either Gross Margin (p<.. 10) or Price-Earnings Ratio (p<*05) as 
important. This relationship is illustrated in Figures 16 and 17. 
As seen in Table 13, the subjects did not regard these variables 
as important and so did not alter their investment pattern from that of 
the subjects who did not receive social information. This may explain 
the apparent contradiction between the results of the two statistical 
tests conducted on the data. 
It can be tentatively concluded from the results of this section 
that 
(1) Investors react to disclosure of discriminatory practices 
when it is expressed in human terms. 
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* 
10000 
Gross Margin (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 16. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Gross 
Margin and the Amount invested in Company J. 
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10000 
Price-Earnings Ratio (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 17. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Price- 
Earnings Ratio and the amount invested in Company J. 
105 
TABLE 13 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE GROSS MARGIN AND 
PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO WHEN COMPANY J DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
GROSS MARGIN PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 7 8 4 5 
5 1 1 1 0 
10 4 6 3 4 
15 0 0 1 0 
20 0 0 2 3 
25 0 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 1 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 1 1 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 1 
Mean 3.75 4.33 10.83 14.67 
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(2) Investors do not react to such disclosures when legal 
penalties are discussed. 
(3) Investors do not react to disclosure of untraditional 
personnel practices. 
4.4 Corporate illegalities. Allegations and admissions of corporate 
wrong-doing have been revealed with frequency over the last several 
years. Rapidly disappearing is the idea that business operates in a 
vacuum. Instead, revelations sometimes show corporations performing 
actions necessary to insure a favorable business climate, even in 
flagrant violation of the law. 
Disclosures of illegalities attributed to corporations in this 
study included: 
Company Type of Disclosure Disclosure Amount 
B negative Fines levied on officers 
charged with buying stock 
using inside knowledge 
$175,000 
C negative Fine for illegal 
campaign contribution 
$75,000 
H negative Illegal employee bonuses $565,000 
The use of "inside" information for personal gain is an illegal 
act which often occurs in the corporate sphere. The act may be moti¬ 
vated by individual greed or by the employee's need for revenge on a 
company that is viewed as having wronged him/her. However, no matter 
what the motive, the action still remains illegal under the laws of the 
regulatory agencies and is subject to such penalties as those disclosed 
to the potential investors in Company B. 
The disclosure of the fines levied on company officers for ille¬ 
gal stock purchases did not affect the action of the potential Investor. 
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Neither Student’s t-test nor the multiple regression with a dummy 
variable produced any statistically significant change in either the 
amount invested or the importance ascribed by the investor to the inde¬ 
pendent variables between the group receiving the negative information 
and the group that did not receive social information. 
It may be conjectured that the lack of investor interest in 
Company 3 may be due to the unsuccessful year portrayed in the financial 
ratios of this company. As shown in Table 14, the amounts invested in 
Company B decreased slightly in the presence of the negative social 
information. 
In the wake of the 1972 presidential election came allegations 
leading to the criminal conviction of corporations and their executives 
on charges of making illegal contributions to the campaigns of various 
political candidates. The frequency of these revelations seemed to 
indicate that information of the type given with the financial ratios 
of Company C would become commonly disclosed in future corporate 
annual reports. 
Illegal corporate campaign contributions are not viewed as a 
severe corporate misdeed by the potential investor. The failure of 
Student's t-test to verify the hypothesized shift in investor behavior 
away from Company C bears this out. 
The only independent variables that exhibited a significant 
shift in indicated importance were a decrease in importance of the 
Earnings Growth (p<.05) as well as an increase in importance of the 
Earnings Margin (p<. 10). It can be theorized that the differences 
resulted from a change in emphasis in the importance placed on current 
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TABLE 14 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY B WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE 
SOCIAL INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY B 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 10 10 
500 0 0 
1000 0 1 
1500 1 0 
2000 1 0 
2500 1 0 
3000 0 1 
3500 0 0 
4000 1 0 
4500 0 0 
5000 0 1 
5500 0 0 
6000 0 1 
6500 0 0 
7000 1 0 
Mean 1133.33 1071.43 
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earnings. The expenditure of $75,000 on fines for illegal conduct 
changed the investment criterion to a financial ratio (Earnings Margin) 
entirely dependent upon current earnings from one of earnings history. 
Table 15 shows the indicated importance of these variables. 
When potential investors utilized the Price-Earnings Ratio as an 
important investment criterion, they were willing to invest signifi¬ 
cantly more in Company C (p<^05) when the information on illegal cam¬ 
paign contributions was revealed than when the only information provided 
was of a financial nature. This result of the multiple regression with 
dummy coded variable is shown in Figure 18. 
As seen in Table 16, the reason this result is not reflected in 
Student's t-test may be that the Price-Earnings Ratio was not considered 
a sufficiently important investment criterion to produce a statistically 
significant test result. 
It may be hypothesized that the lack of statistically signifi¬ 
cant results occurred because of the following investor reactions 
(1) the disclosure of corporate wrongdoing simply reinforced an 
idea that the investor already held and so was not 
surprising enough to produce a reaction; 
(2) illegal campaign contributions were thought to be too common 
to produce a negative investor reaction. The potential 
investor responded to the stimulus with the idea everyone's 
doing it, they just got caught." 
(3) a sufficient time has elapsed since such disclosures were 
made that the investor no longer reacts to such disclosure. 
The expenditure of a large amount of money on illegal employee 
bonuses, while not a frequent disclosure, was actually found in one 
corporate annual report. Such payments serve as a device to enable 
corporations to reduce their income tax liabilities while at the same 
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TABLE 15 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE EARNINGS MARGIN AND 
EARNINGS GROWTH WHEN COMPANY C DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
-- INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS MARGIN EARNINGS GROWTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 10 5 1 5 
5 0 1 0 2 
8 0 0 0 0 
10 4 3 4 3 
13 0 0 0 0 
15 0 1 2 1 
18 0 0 0 0 
20 1 1 7 2 
23 0 0 0 0 
25 0 1 0 0 
28 0 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 1 
33 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 
43 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
48 0 0 0 0 
50 0 1 1 0 
Mean 4.00 13.21 17.33 8.93 
Ill 
10000 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 18. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Price- 
Earnings Ratio and the amount invested in Company C. 
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TABLE 16 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO WHEN 
COMAPNY C DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN 
- NEGATIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO 
Indicated 
Importance 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 3 8 
5 1 0 
10 4 4 
15 1 0 
20 5 0 
25 1 0 
30 0 0 
35 0 0 
40 0 1 
45 0 0 
50 0 0 
Mean 12.33 9.29 
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time rewarding employees outside the terms of the union contract. 
Recent disclosures have indicated that such bonuses were channeled 
through employees to political figures in the form of a disguised 
corporate campaign contribution. Such bonuses also can find their way 
to vendors as kickbacks as well as being made in ways that evade 
taxation. 
As has been found in the previous situations, the disclosure of 
this form of corporate illegality produced little response from the 
potential investor. 
This disclosure did not produce any statistically significant 
change in the amount of money the potential investor was willing to 
invest in Company H over that invested when no such information was 
received. This resulted in the failure of Student’s t-test to verify 
the operational hypothesis. 
The only independent variable that yielded a statistically 
significant change in indicated importance was the Price-Earnings Ratio 
(pj^.Ol) which diminished in importance in the presence of social 
information. It appears that this type of social information caused the 
investor to consider the Price-Earnings Ratio to be a poor measure of 
corporate success. This may be due to a feeling that either the market 
price of the firm's stock or the earnings for the year have been tem¬ 
porarily reduced by the illegal bonuses. Table 17 shows the indicated 
importance of the Price-Earnings Ratio for both groups. 
Subjects who regarded the independent variable Price-Earnings 
Ratio as important also were willing to invest significantly less 
(p<.10) money in Company H when the negative social information was pro- 
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TABLE 17 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO WHEN 
COMPANY H DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN 
NEGATIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO 
Indicated 
Importance 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 1 5 
5 0 0 
10 0 4 
15 3 0 
20 1 3 
25 0 0 
30 2 1 
35 0 0 
40 0 2 
45 0 0 
50 3 0 
55 0 0 
60 0 0 
65 0 0 
70 0 0 
75 1 0 
80 0 0 
85 0 0 
90 0 0 
95 0 0 
100 2 0 
Mean 42.31 14.00 
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vided than when no social information was given. This result of the 
multiple regression with a dummy variable is reflected in Figure 19. 
As shown in Table 17, there were no potential investors who 
considered the Price-Earnings Ratio as very important when they received 
the social information. It can be conjectured that if there were some 
investors who considered this ratio as a very important investment cri¬ 
terion, the amounts invested might have been different. 
The results of this section may be seen as indicative of a lack 
of investor concern and alarm over illegal corporate behavior. Whether 
this is due to acceptance of such behavior by the investor or apathy 
produced by frequent exposure to such disclosure is a matter of conjec¬ 
ture and further research. 
4.5 International involvement. With the high cost of labor and 
certain raw materials, many domestic corporations are transferring 
their manufacturing facilities outside the United States to countries 
where either labor costs are lower or the necessary raw materials are 
plentiful. Such activities face increased opposition from citizens 
and various citizen groups who feel that the activities are unpatriotic 
or who are opposed to the policies of the governments in which the 
firms reside. One of the most controversial policies is the apartheid 
policy of South Africa. Firms with facilities there are coming under 
increasing pressure to cease their involvement in that country. 
Activities such as product boycotts and investment divestiture are 
used to protest corporate involvement. The two types of social 
Information below involved South Africa, which is the center of such 
protests: 
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10000 
Price-Earnings Ratio (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 19. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Price- 
Earnings Ratio and the amount invested in Company H. 
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Company Type of Disclosure Disclosure Amount 
C positive Loss due to divestiture $15,000 
of investment in South 
Africa 
E negative Invested in plant in 
South Africa 
$400,000 
Although corporations are encouraged to end their involvement 
in countries with unpopular governmental policies, the potential 
investor does not appear to be affected by such action. The results 
of Student’s t-test revealed no statistically significant change 
in the pattern of Investment when the Lnvestor received information on 
corporate dLvestiture. 
This can be Interpreted to mean that people and organizations 
that already have Investments are much more concerned about corporate 
International InvoLvement than are potential Investors. 
A statistically significant change did occur, however, in the 
Independent variables used as investment criteria In the presence of the 
Information. The potential Investors Indicated that Earnings Growth and 
Sales Growth (p(*05) decreased and that the Earnings Margin (p\. li)) 
Increased In importance. 
This change In Investment criteria, given the similarity In the 
re 1 atlonsli 1 pa o! these Independent variables between Companies C and 1), 
appears to reflect a change of criterion from one reflecting earnings 
history to one based on current earnings and sales alone. I he change 
In Investor preference also resulted In an Increase In the amount 
not si at 1 si lea Ily significant, there was an Increase In the amount 
Invested In Company C In the presence of positive social Information 
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which is a change in the hypothesized direction. 
Tables 18 and 19 contain the values discussed above. 
The results of the multiple regression with a dummy variable 
revealed that the investor who indicated that the independent variables 
Earnings Margin and Return on Net Worth were very important invested 
significantly more in Company C when social information was provided 
than when no such disclosure was made. This relationship is shown in 
Figures 20 and 21. However, as seen in Table 20, the investors in this 
study did not indicate that these variables were important in their 
decisionmaking. This lack of importance may explain why there was no 
statistically significant increase in the amount invested in Company G. 
There seems to exist a subpopulation that may verify the operational 
hypothesis and that considers Earnings Margin and Return on Net Worth to 
be important. 
The second type of disclosure presented the subject with the 
opposite situation of investment in a country with social policies 
many people find objectionable. As in the previous situation, the 
feelings against apartheid expressed by current investors are not 
reflected in the responses of the potential investors. The results of 
Student’s t-test failed to verify the hypothesized statistically 
significant decrease in the amount invested in Company E. However, as 
shown in Table 21, the potential investor was willing to invest less 
money in the presence of the social disclosure, which lends support to 
the operational hypothesis. 
A comparison of the investment criteria used by the subjects 
given the expenditure of $400,000 on investment in South Africa with 
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TABLE 18 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY C WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL 
INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY C 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 11 6 
500 0 0 
1000 0 1 
1500 0 0 
2000 0 3 
2500 0 0 
3000 1 1 
3500 0 0 
4000 1 1 
4500 0 0 
5000 0 0 
5500 0 0 
6000 1 0 
6500 0 0 
7000 1 0 
7500 0 1 
8000 0 1 
8500 0 0 
9000 0 0 
9500 0 0 
10000 0 1 
Mean 1333.33 2633.33 
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TABLE 19 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS GROWTH, SALES GROWTH 
AND EARNINGS MARGIN WHEN COMPANY C DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
- INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS GROWTH SALES GROWTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 1 4 1 5 
4 0 0 0 0 
5 0 3 1 3 
9 0 0 0 1 
10 4 3 6 2 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 2 3 1 1 
19 0 0 0 0 
20 7 1 3 2 
24 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 1 1 
29 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 1 0 
34 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
39 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
44 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
49 0 0 0 0 
50 1 0 1 0 
Mean 17.33 9.33 16.33 8.27 
ic; 
rt, 
0 
4 
5 
9 
10 
14 
15 
19 
20 
24 
25 
29 
30 
34 
35 
39 
40 
44 
45 
49 
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TABLE 19 (Continued) 
EARNINGS MARGIN 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
10 5 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
4 6 
0 0 
0 1 
0 0 
1 2 
0 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
o 0 
0 0 
o 0 
4.00 9.33 
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: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 20. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
and Net Worth and the amount invested in Company C. 
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Indicated importance of 
Earnings Margin (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 21. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Margin and the amount invested in Company C. 
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TABLE 20 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS MARGIN AND RETURN ON 
NET WORTH WHEN COMPANY C DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND 
WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS MARGIN RETURN ON NET WORTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 10 5 5 7 
5 0 0 2 3 
10 4 6 3 1 
15 0 1 0 1 
20 1 2 5 1 
25 0 1 0 1 
30 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 1 
Mean 4.00 9.33 9.33 9.00 
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TABLE 21 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY E WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL 
INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
AMOUNT INVESTED 
without social 
disclosure 
IN COMPANY E 
with social 
disclosure 
0 0 4 
500 0 0 
1000 0 1 
1500 0 0 
2000 1 0 
2500 1 0 
3000 2 1 
3500 0 0 
4000 1 2 
4500 0 0 
5000 2 1 
5500 0 0 
6000 1 1 
6500 0 0 
7000 1 0 
7500 0 0 
8000 2 1 
8500 0 0 
9000 0 1 
9500 0 0 
10000 4 2 
Mean 6233.33 4285.71 
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those that were not supplied the information revealed a change in 
investment strategy that proved statistically significant using 
Student's t-test. 
The change in investment strategy that was revealed was an 
increase in the importance of the independent variable Earnings Growth 
(p_<.05) with a corresponding decrease in the use of Dividends per Share 
(pj<.02). Since the value of the latter variable is larger for Company E 
than for Company F while the opposite is true for Earnings Growth, it 
can be theorized that the subjects changed their criteria in an attempt 
to justify the decrease in investment. Another reason for the change on 
the part of the investors might be the realization that if the company 
can increase its earnings over previous years with the substantial 
expenditure, the future may be even more successful, leading to a growth 
pattern equal to or greater than Company F. If this growth pattern 
occurs, then current dividends are not important because the future 
should be even better. The importance indicated by the subjects for the 
two independent variables is found in Table 22. 
The hypothesized decrease in the amount invested in the presence 
of negative information is verified for several variables using the 
multiple regression with a dummy variable. Earnings per Share (p<^10), 
Gross Margin (p<.05), and Return on Net Worth (p<^05) exhibited a sta¬ 
tistically significant decrease in the amount invested in Company E for 
subjects who did not consider the variable as an investment criterion. 
When the subjects considered either of the two former variables as very 
important, the amount invested in Company E became significantly larger 
(p<.10) in the presence of the social information than in its absence. 
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TABLE 22 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF DIVIDENDS PER SHARE AND 
EARNINGS GROWTH WHEN COMPANY E DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
DIVIDENDS PER SHARE EARNINGS GROWTH 
Indicated 
Importance 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 2 5 7 2 
4 0 1 0 0 
5 2 1 2 2 
10 1 5 4 3 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 1 0 
20 3 1 1 5 
24 0 0 0 0 
25 2 0 0 1 
30 2 0 0 0 
34 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 
44 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 1 
dical 
ortai 
54 
55 
60 
64 
65 
70 
74 
75 
80 
Mean 
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TABLE 22 (Continued) 
DIVIDENDS PER SHARE 
without with 
social social 
disclosure disclosure 
EARNINGS GROWTH 
without with 
social social 
disclosure disclosure 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25.67 8.50 5.67 15.37 
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These relationships are shown in Figures 22-24. 
It can be theorized that the reason the relationships that 
proved statistically significant for Earnings per Share and Gross Margin 
were not reflected in Student's t-test was the difference in the nature 
of what was being tested. In Student's t-test, the means of the indi¬ 
cated importance of the independent variables of both groups are being 
compared to determine their probability of their being from different 
populations. The multiple regression analyzes the differences between 
the regression lines which express the amount invested as a function of 
the indicated importance of the variable. Although there exists a sta¬ 
tistically significant difference in the y-intercept of the regression 
lines, the slope of the responses may not differ significantly. The 
interaction of the two characteristics found to be statistically signi¬ 
ficant for Earnings per Share and Gross Margin may account for the lack 
of difference in the means. 
Likewise, the similarity of sample means for the variable Return 
on Net Worth may cause the lack of statistical significance of Student's 
t-test. 
The last independent variable that proved statistically signifi¬ 
cant was the Price-Earnings Ratio (p<^05). When the subjects used the 
Price-Earnings Ratio as a major criterion leading to their investment 
decision, they invested less in Company E when provided with the social 
information. This result may not be reflected elsewhere because of the 
few subjects that ranked this variable highly. It can be theorized that 
there exists a subpopulation that would invest significantly less in 
Company E using the Price-Earnings Ratio as critical information. 
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: without social disclosure 
i with social disclosure 
i‘i'jur<i Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the 1 fives tor - indicated importance of 
barnlrips par Hhare and the amount invested in Company E. 
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Gross Margin (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 23. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Gross 
Margin and the amount invested in Company E. 
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10000 
Return on Net Worth (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 24. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company E. 
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The frequency of occurrence of Che several variables discussed 
above are found in Table 23. 
The results of the responses to the social disclosure of inter¬ 
national involvement implies that there exists some investor reaction to 
information of this nature. Further research on the attitudes of poten¬ 
tial investors could prove beneficial. In addition, it can be conjec¬ 
tured that the use of a larger sample might produce more significant 
results. 
4.6 Quality of products. The consuming public increasingly demands 
products that are optimally safe and free from defects. If a company 
fails to produce up to the level of public expectations, several 
different actions may be taken. If voluntary recalls are not 
undertaken, the government may force these actions under threat of 
legal suit. Consumers who are injured directly or placed in jeopardy 
may file suit against the offending corporation. The response of 
potential investors to governmental and legal actions are explored in 
two disclosures provided in this study. 
Company Type of Disclosure Disclosure Amount 
D negative F.D.A. forced withdrawal 
of product from market 
$300,000 
K negative Fine for selling unsafe 
product 
$450,000 
The forced withdrawal of a product by the Food and Drug 
Administration is becoming increasingly commonplace as everything from 
asbestos in hair dryers to saccharine in foodstuffs is suspected of 
being detrimental to one’s health. 
As shown in the results of Student’s t-test, the subjects who 
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TABLE 23 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS PER SHARE, 
GROSS MARGIN, RETURN ON NET WORTH, AND PRICE-EARNINGS 
RATIO WHEN COMPANY E DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL 
DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS PER SHARE GROSS MARGIN 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 0 4 7 6 
3 0 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 1 
5 4 0 2 0 
10 3 1 1 5 
13 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 
15 0 1 1 0 
20 2 4 2 1 
23 0 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 0 
25 1 0 0 0 
30 3 2 1 1 
33 0 0 0 0 
34 0 0 0 0 
35 1 0 1 0 
40 1 1 0 0 
43 0 0 0 0 
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TABLE 23 (Continued) 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS 
without 
social 
disclosure 
PER SHARE 
with 
social 
disclosure 
GROSS 
without 
social 
disclosure 
MARGIN 
with 
social 
disclosure 
44 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 
53 0 0 0 0 
54 0 0 0 0 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
63 0 0 0 0 
64 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
73 0 0 0 0 
74 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 
Mean 18.67 14.93 9.33 7.43 
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TABLE 23 (Continued) 
RETURN ON NET WORTH PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO 
without with without with 
Indicated social social social social 
Importance disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure 
0 8 
3 0 
4 0 
5 1 
10 2 
13 0 
14 0 
15 0 
20 2 
23 0 
24 0 
25 0 
30 1 
33 0 
34 0 
35 0 
40 1 
43 0 
44 0 
45 0 
50 0 
53 0 
54 0 
6 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
4 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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TABLE 23 fContinued; 
Indicated 
Importance 
BETTES OS SET WORTH PRICE-EAKMIKGS RATIO 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
63 0 0 0 0 
64 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
73 0 0 0 0 
74 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 1 
9-00 8.929 15.33 16.929 
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were provided social information on such a recall responded with a sta¬ 
tistically significant decrease in the amount invested in Company D 
(p_<. 10). This result verified the operational hypothesis that negative 
social information produces a decrease in investment. The amounts 
invested within the groups that received nothing but financial infor¬ 
mation and the information on the product recall are found in Table 24. 
The analysis of the relationship between the independent 
variables for the two groups using the same test revealed a statisti¬ 
cally significant decrease (pj<. 10) in the importance of Earnings per 
Share as an investment criterion. The importance of Earnings per Share 
indicated by the subjects is found in Table 25. 
It can be conjectured that the disclosure of the product recall 
caused a strong investor reaction. This was reflected in a decrease in 
the importance that the potential investor placed on the investment 
criterion ranked most important by the group which received no negative 
information. 
It appears that the disclosure of a $300,000 loss on a product 
withdrawal resulted in a definite change in both amount invested in the 
firm and in the investment criteria. 
The change in the investment strategy found using Student's t- 
test continued to be found in the results of the multiple regression 
with a dummy variable. As explained earlier, since the results found on 
Table 36 reflect the relationships between the amount invested in 
Company C, with and without the social disclosure, the sign of the y- 
intercept must be reversed to compare the responses for Company D. The 
slope of the regression line remains the same in the new comparison. 
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TABLE 24 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY D WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE SOCIAL 
INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY D 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 0 1 
1000 0 0 
2000 0 1 
3000 1 0 
4000 1 0 
5000 0 4 
6000 1 1 
7000 1 1 
8000 0 2 
9000 0 2 
10000 11 4 
Mean 8666.67 6812.50 
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THE INVESTOR- 
COMPANY 
TABLE 25 
■INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS PER SHARE WHEN 
D DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN 
NEGATIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
EARNINGS PER SHARE 
without with 
Indicated social social 
Importance disclosure disclosure 
0 2 5 
3 0 0 
5 0 3 
8 1 0 
10 2 2 
13 0 0 
15 0 0 
18 0 0 
20 6 4 
23 0 0 
25 1 0 
28 0 0 
30 0 1 
33 0 0 
35 0 1 
38 0 0 
40 1 0 
43 0 0 
45 0 0 
48 0 0 
50 2 9 
Mean 20.83 11.25 
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When the independent variables were not deemed important and 
negative information was received, the regression lines of the indepen¬ 
dent variables Dividends per Share (p_<. 10), Earnings per Share (p<.05), 
Return on Net Worth, Earnings Growth (p<^ 10) and Sales Growth (pj<.05) 
all had investments in Company D that were significantly below those 
made when the potential investors received no social disclosure. In 
addition, the last two independent variables also had a significant 
decrease (p<^05 and p<^10, respectively) in the amount invested when 
the subjects rated the independent variable as highly important in the 
decision-making process. The relationships described above are found in 
Figures 25-29. 
The frequencies found in Table 26 reveal that more potential 
investors, when given the negative disclosure, reduced their reliance on 
the independent variables found significant in the multiple regression. 
This seems to imply that the investors changed their investment criteria 
to those where the financial ratios for Company C exceeded Company D as 
a justification for their reduced investment. In addition, the Social 
Information parameter was given importance by several of the subjects. 
Table 26 also reveals the lack of high importance placed on the two 
independent variables found to significantly reduce the investment when 
so rated. This implies the potential existence of subjects that will 
both rank the growth ratios as important and reduce their investment in 
the company disclosing negative information. 
It appears that the amount of money expended or lost as the 
result of negative social actions concerning quality of products did not 
affect the potential investor. In both instances, the money involved 
10000 
:no .catec irportanee o f 
Liv-dends par Share (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Fir;>re 2S, Graphic presentation of the relation 
so. p netween the _ r. yes tor—indicated irportance of 
Li y.denes per Share and the amount invested in Company D 
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Earnings per Share (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 26. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share and the amount invested in Company D. 
10000 
Return on Net Worth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 27. Graphic presentation of the relation 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Return on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company D 
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10000 
Earnings Growth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 28. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company D. 
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100 
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Figure 29. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Sales 
Growth and the amount invested in Company D. 
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TABLE 26 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF DIVIDENDS PER SHARE, EARNINGS 
PER SHARE, RETURN ON NET WORTH, EARNINGS GROWTH, SALES GROWTH 
AND SOCIAL INFORMATION WHEN COMPANY D DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL 
INFORMATION AND WHEN NEGATIVE 
SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
DIVIDENDS PER SHARE EARNINGS PER SHARE 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 3 5 2 5 
5 2 2 0 3 
8 0 0 1 0 
10 5 4 2 2 
15 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 
20 2 4 6 4 
25 1 0 1 0 
28 0 0 0 0 
30 1 1 0 1 
35 0 0 0 1 
38 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 1 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
48 0 0 0 0 
50 1 0 2 0 
Mean 13.67 10.00 20.83 11.25 
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TABLE 26 (Continued) 
Indicated 
Importance 
RETURN ON NET WORTH EARNINGS GROWTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 5 6 1 2 
5 2 2 0 1 
8 0 0 0 0 
10 3 3 4 5 
15 0 1 2 4 
18 0 0 0 0 
20 5 0 7 3 
25 0 2 0 0 
28 0 0 0 0 
30 0 1 0 1 
35 0 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
48 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 1 0 
Mean 9.33 10.94 17.33 12.81 
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TABLE 26 (Continued) 
SALES GROWTH SOCIAL INFORMATION 
without with with 
Indicated social social social 
Importance disclosure disclosure disclosure 
0 1 3 9 
5 1 1 2 
8 0 0 0 
10 6 8 0 
15 1 1 0 
18 0 0 0 
20 3 1 2 
25 1 1 0 
28 0 0 0 
30 1 0 2 
35 0 0 0 
38 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 
48 0 0 0 
50 1 1 1 
Mean 16.33 12.19 10.00 
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was several hundred thousand dollars but the responses were different. 
The payment of a $400,000 fine for selling an unsafe product 
produced a statistically significant change in only one independent 
variable. The" results of Student’s t-test revealed a statistically 
significant decrease (p<^. 10) in the importance placed on the Return on 
Net Worth in the presence of the negative social disclosure pertaining 
to Company K. The importance placed on this independent variable is 
found in Table 27. Excluding the eighty point response from the com¬ 
putation of Student's t-test does not change the statistically signifi¬ 
cant results. 
It can be theorized that the presence of disclosure of a 
substantial fine for unsafe products caused the potential investor to 
change investment criteria from those which were substantially different 
between the two companies to those where the differences were less pro¬ 
nounced. 
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from the results of 
this section: 
(1) the disclosure of a government-ordered product withdrawal 
evokes a strong response from the potential investor ; 
(2) no matter what amount of money is paid, investors do not 
respond to the payment of fines; 
(3) potential investors change their investment criteria to 
rationalize their change in investment strategy. 
4,7 Community involvement. The expanded role of the firm has produced 
increased involvement with many areas outside the corporation. One of 
the most diversified areas of external interaction is with the com¬ 
munity. Some of the benefits that the corporation derives from the com- 
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TABLE 27 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF RETURN ON NET WORTH WHEN 
COMPANY K DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN 
NEGATIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
RETURN ON NET WORTH 
Indicated 
Importance 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 4 7 
2.5 0 1 
5.0 0 2 
7.5 0 0 
10.Q 2 2 
12.5 0 0 
15.0 2 0 
17.5 0 0 
20.0 1 2 
22.5 0 0 
25.0 1 0 
27.5 0 0 
30.0 0 0 
32.5 0 0 
35.0 0 0 
37.5 0 0 
40.0 1 0 
42.5 0 0 
45.0 0 0 
47.5 0 0 
TABLE 27 (Continued) 
RETURN ON NET WORTH 
Indicated 
Importance 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
50.0 0 0 
52.5 0 0 
55.0 0 0 
57.5 0 0 
60.0 0 0 
62.5 0 0 
65.0 0 0 
67.5 0 0 
70.0 0 0 
72.5 0 0 
75.0 0 0 
77.5 0 0 
80.0 1 0 
Mean 17.92 5.18 
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raunity are direct, such as public relations and image-building, while 
others are indirect, such as income tax benefits. 
Several different types of disclosure were made to the potential 
investors representing both types of corporate benefits. The disclo¬ 
sures were: 
Company Type of Disclosure Disclosure Amount 
B positive Cost of training program $75,000 
for the disadvantaged 
D positive Paid full salaries to $230,000 
personnel working in 
community projects 
E positive Donated money to community $500,000 
for urban renewal 
G positive Cost of reclaiming land $180,000 
that was strip-rained 
K positive Cost of revitalizing and $750,000 
expanding production 
facilities in an older 
metropolitan area 
Corporate involvement with the disadvantaged is an area of 
disclosure commonly found in annual reports. The benefits take many 
forms including financial aid to minority students, active recruitment 
of the handicapped and minorities, and minority training programs at the 
entry and management levels. 
The results of Student's t-test revealed that this type of 
disclosure did not cause any statistically significant change in invest¬ 
ment strategy. The lack of changes in investor response also extended 
to the independent variables, where no statistically significant changes 
in investment strategy appeared using Student's t-test. 
A similar lack of statistically significant results was found 
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using the multiple regression with a dummy variable. This test revealed 
that, no matter how important the independent variables were considered 
to be, there were no statistically significant changes in the amounts 
invested in Company B in the presence of the social disclosure. 
Several possible reasons for this lack of results can be conjec¬ 
tured. The potential investors may have deemed corporate assistance to 
members of minorities to be sufficiently commonplace as to be unworthy 
of response. They may also have considered such aid to be self-serving 
in that it prevented government interference and possible legal action. 
Lastly, the financial information for Company B revealed a poor finan¬ 
cial year. The impact of the information on the potential investor 
might not be changed by positive corporate social action. 
A similar lack of investor response was found when the potential 
investor was given information concerning corporate employees who were 
paid their full corporate salaries while working in the community. The 
only exception to the lack of response were the results of Student's 
t-test which showed a statistically significant decrease (p_<.05) in the 
importance attributed to the independent variable, Price-Earnings Ratio, 
when given the social information (see Table 28). 
It appears that the potential information changed the investor's 
investment criterion from one based on the market price of the stock to 
others. This may be due to a perception that such direct community 
involvement and ensuing publicity will temporarily inflate the market 
price of the stock and thereby lead to an exaggerated Price-Earnings 
Ratio. 
Although corporations frequently encourage their employees to 
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TABLE 28 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF THE PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO WHEN 
COMPANY D DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN 
POSITIVE DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
PRICE-EARNINGS 
without 
social 
disclosure 
RATIO 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 3 6 
5 1 1 
10 4 3 
15 1 0 
20 5 1 
25 1 1 
Mean 12.33 5.00 
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become involved in the community on their own time, corporate encourage¬ 
ment frequently does not materialize when employees seek, involvement 
during working hours. Most people who are allowed such release time 
must absorb a loss from it in the form of reduced pay or the use of per¬ 
sonal or vacation time. Although the community can benefit from the 
expertise of many workers, very few firms can afford or are aware of the 
public relations benefits of the direct absorption of the costs that 
were outlined in this social disclosure. 
Corporate involvement with the community may also take the form 
of improving the geographical area in which the firm operates or where 
the employees live. The type of direct, visible involvement that this 
provides is important, not only because of the public relations benefit, 
but also because many corporations are located in inner-city areas. 
Firms appear to be taking one of two positions to avoid the problem of 
urban blight. They either relocate in the suburbs or they contribute 
financially to improving their urban environments. 
The response of the potential investor to the direct corporate 
involvement in the inner city was more pronounced than in the previous 
disclosures. Although no statistically significant change occurred in 
the amount invested in Company E when the potential investor received 
the social information than when the decision was based entirely on the 
financial ratios, there was a statistically significant change in the 
investment criteria used under Student's t-test. 
As shown in Table 29, the potential investors significantly 
reduced the importance that they placed on the independent variables 
Dividends per Share (p_<.05). Earnings. Margin (p£. 10) and Earnings per 
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TABLE 29 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF DIVIDENDS PER SHARE, EARNINGS 
GROWTH, EARNINGS MARGIN, AND EARNINGS PER SHARE WHEN COMPANY E 
DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE 
SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
DIVIDENDS PER SHARE EARNINGS GROWTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 2 4 7 4 
3 0 0 0 0 
5 2 3 2 0 
10 1 3 4 5 
13 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 1 2 
20 3 3 1 2 
23 0 0 0 0 
25 2 1 0 0 
30 2 0 0 0 
33 0 0 0 1 
35 0 0 0 1 
40 0 1 0 1 
43 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 
53 0 0 0 0 
55 1 0 0 0 
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TABLE 29 (Continued) 
Indicated 
Importance 
- DIVIDENDS PER SHARE EARNINGS GROWTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
60 1 0 0 0 
63 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
73 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 
80 1 0 0 0 
Mean 25.67 11.33 5.67 12.53 
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TABLE 29 (Continued) 
EARNINGS MARGIN 
without with 
social social 
disclosure disclosure 
EARNINGS PER SHARE 
without with 
social social 
disclosure disclosure 
6 
0 
1 
3 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
2 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
3 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
1 
2 
0 
4 
3 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9.00 4.00 18.67 11.33 
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Share (pj<. 10) when the social disclosure was made. These changes were 
coupled with a statistically significant increase in the importance of 
Earnings Growth (p_<.05). 
It appears that the potential investor realized that the 
earnings ratios and return to the investors in the form of dividends 
were understated due to the $500,000 expenditure in the community. 
Therefore, the growth in earnings was really larger than reported and 
became more important to the potential investor as an indicator of 
future corporate success. As shown in Figure 30, the results of the 
multiple regression with a dummy variable revealed that when the poten¬ 
tial investor did not consider the independent variable, Earnings per 
Share, as an important investment criterion, he/she invested signifi¬ 
cantly less in Company E (p_<. 10) when given the social information than 
when no social disclosure was made. In addition, people who considered 
this independent variable as a very important investment criterion 
invested significantly more in Company E (p<^05) when they received the 
social information than when only financial information was supplied. 
As seen in Table 30, very few potential investors considered this 
variable in either category. It can be conjectured that if the number 
of subjects had been increased, results of Student's t-test might have 
been different. 
The reclamation of land damaged by a firm's business activities 
represents a highly visible interaction between the company and the 
community. Mandated by community pressure, it is a response which gives 
the corporation a chance to improve the original environment. 
Although the potential investors did not significantly- change 
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0 50 100 
Indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 30. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share and the amount invested in Company E. 
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TABLE 30 
THE INVESTOR- -INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS PER SHARE WHEN 
COMPANY E DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN 
POSITIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS PER SHARE 
without social with social 
disclosure disclosure 
0 0 4 
5 4 1 
10 3 2 
15 0 4 
20 2 3 
25 1 1 
30 3 0 
35 1 0 
40 1 0 
Mean 18.67 11.33 
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the amount of money they invested in Company G when they received infor¬ 
mation on land reclamation, there was a statistically significant 
increase (p_<. 10) using Student’s t-test in the importance placed on the 
independent variable, Dividends per Share. 
It may be conjectured that potential investors felt the amount 
of dividends paid became important because it was paid even though there 
was the expenditure of $180,000 for land reclamation. In addition, the 
potential investors may have regarded this dividend amount as a minimum 
with more to be paid in the future. 
The results of the multiple regression with a dummy variable 
revealed that the potential investors who did not consider the indepen¬ 
dent variable, Return on Net Worth, important in their decision-making 
process invested significantly less (p_<.01) in Company G when they were 
given the expenditure on land reclamation than those who did not receive 
any social information. In addition, those who considered this indepen¬ 
dent variable very important as a decision criterion were willing to 
invest significantly more (p<^.01) in Company G when they received the 
social information than when they received only the financial ratios. 
This relationship is shown on Figure 31. 
This test also revealed that, when people considered the inde¬ 
pendent variable, Earnings per Share, to be a very important influence 
in their decision-making, they invested significantly less (p<^10) in 
Company G when they were given the social information than when the 
decision was based entirely on financial information. This relationship 
is found in Figure 32. 
As seen in Table 31, very few investors considered Return on Net 
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Earnings per Share (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 31. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share and the amount invested in Company G. 
10000 
Return on Net Worth (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 32. Graphic presentation of the relation 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Return on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company G 
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TABLE 31 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS PER SHARE AND RETURN 
ON NET WORTH WHEN COMPANY G DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION 
AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS PER SHARE RETURN ON NET WORTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 4 5 7 5 
5 1 0 1 0 
10 4 2 2 0 
15 1 2 0 3 
20 2 3 1 1 
25 1 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 1 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 2 1 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 0 1 
Mean 9.62 9.17 11.15 18.75 
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Worth to have no importance and only one person considered either 
variable to be very important as a decision-making criterion. 
The expenditure of $750,000 to renew and expand an urban produc¬ 
tion facility - produced an investor response that was markedly different 
from that discussed previously. As seen in Table 32, the result of 
Student's t-test, which found a statistically significant increase 
(p<^01) in the amount invested in Company K, verifies the operational 
hypothesis when the social information was given with the financial 
ratios over the investment based on the financial ratios alone. 
Potential investors may have considered Company K a better 
investment with the social disclosure because the expenditure repre¬ 
sented a single capital outlay with substantial future benefits in the 
form of increased earnings. The earnings will be partially offset by 
increased depreciation which reduces taxes while not reducing the cash 
available for return to the investors. 
The results of Student's t-test on the independent variables 
revealed a statistically significant decrease in the importance that the 
investors placed on the Earnings Margin (p^C.02) and the Return on Net 
Worth (p<.10) when they received the social information. The indicated 
importance of these variables is found in Table 33. 
Potential investors may have regarded the relatively low finan¬ 
cial ratios of Company K which were reported for these independent 
variables less critically when they received the social information 
because the ratios may be increased substantially by the expenditure and 
so not be an accurate indication of future corporate advances. 
As explained earlier, since the multiple regression with a dummy 
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TABLE 32 
THE AMOUNT INVESTED IN COMPANY J WHEN THE INVESTOR RECEIVED ONLY 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL 
INFORMATION WAS DISCLOSED 
Amount 
Invested ($) 
without social 
disclosure 
with social 
disclosure 
0 4 1 
1000 0 1 
2000 1 0 . 
3000 1 1 
4000 1 1 
5000 1 1 
6000 1 1 
7000 0 0 
8000 1 2 
9000 0 1 
10000 2 5 
Mean 4000 6714.29 
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TABLE 33 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS MARGIN AND RETURN ON 
NET WORTH WHEN COMPANY K DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION 
AND WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS MARGIN RETURN ON NET WORTH 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 3 8 4 8 
5 1 4 0 2 
10 5 1 2 2 
15 2 1 2 1 
20 1 0 1 1 
25 0 0 1 0 
30 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 1 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 0 0 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 1 0 
Mean 8.75 3.21 17.92 5.38 
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variable was run comparing the amounts invested in Company J with and 
without the social information, it is necessary to take the inverse of 
the sign of the results of the y-intercept when discussing Company K. 
The results of this test verified the relationship found using 
Student's t-test. Subjects who did not consider the independent 
variables Earnings Growth (p<^.05), Earnings per Share (p_<.05), Gross 
Margin (p<_.05), Price-Earnings Ratio (p_<.05), or Return on Net Worth 
(p_<. 10) important in their decision-making invested significantly more 
in Company K in the presence of the social information than without it. 
The statistically significant (p^. 10) increase in investment continued 
at all levels of indicated importance for the variable Return on Net 
Worth. These relationships are found in Figures 33-37. 
Although only the Gross Margin had a large number of potential 
investors who indicated that it was not important in their decision¬ 
making, the combined effects of those who indicated that some or all 
of the five independent variables discussed above were unimportant may 
have caused the results obtained using Student's t-test. The investor- 
indicated importance of the independent variables is found in Table 34. 
To summarize, several tentative conclusions are suggested in 
this section: 
(1) direct community assistance to urban geographic areas in the 
form of urban renewal monies and plant expansion in such 
areas evoked a stronger investor response than other types 
of involvement; 
(2) investors did not react to corporate aid to minorities 
because it is too commonplace or was viewed as preventing 
government interference; 
(3) corporate social activities did not change investor patterns 
when firms had bad years; . 
171 
& 
S' 
10000 
y 
5000 
c 
•H 
T3 — 
(U </> 
4-1 
CO 
<D *4 
> 
c 
•H 
-P 
C 
3 
C 
n3 
a 
6 
o 
o u 
Y = 4000 
0 50 
Indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth (points) 
100 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 33. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company K. 
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10000 
Earnings per Share (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 34. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share and the amount invested in Company K. 
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Gross Margin (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 35. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Gross 
Margin and the amount invested in Company K. 
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10000 
Price-Earnings Ratio (points) 
without social disclosure 
with social disclosure 
Figure 36. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Price- 
Earnings Ratio and the amount invested in Company K. 
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10000 
Return on Net Worth (points) 
: without social disclosure 
: with social disclosure 
Figure 37. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company K. 
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TABLE 34 
THE INVESTOR-INDICATED IMPORTANCE OF EARNINGS GROWTH, EARNINGS PER 
SHARE, GROSS MARGIN, PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO, AND RETURN ON NET 
WORTH WHEN COMPANY K DISCLOSED NO SOCIAL INFORMATION AND 
WHEN POSITIVE SOCIAL DISCLOSURE WAS MADE 
Indicated 
Importance 
EARNINGS GROWTH EARNINGS PER SHARE 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
without 
social 
disclosure 
with 
social 
disclosure 
0 4 6 4 4 
5 0 1 0 1 
10 2 4 1 3 
15 2 0 2 0 
20 2 1 4 3 
25 1 2 0 2 
30 1 0 0 1 
35 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 
50 0 0 1 0 
55 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 0 0 
Mean 12.08 8.21 14.17 12.50 
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TABLE 34 (Continued) 
GROSS MARGIN PRICE-EARNINGS RATIO 
without with without with 
social social social social 
disclosure disclosure disclosure disclosure 
7 
1 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
1 
3 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
1 
3 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.75 5.36 10.83 11.43 
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TABLE 34 (Continued) 
RETURN ON NET WORTH 
Indicated without social with social 
Importance disclosure disclosure 
0 4 8 
5 0 2 
10 2 2 
15 2 0 
20 1 1 
25 1 1 
30 0 0 
35 0 0 
40 1 0 
45 0 0 
50 0 0 
55 0 0 
60 0 0 
65 0 0 
70 0 0 
75 0 0 
80 1 0 
Mean 17.92 5.36 
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(4) potential investors appeared to change their investment 
criteria, based on perceptions of the effects that social acti¬ 
vities would have on the financial statements of future years. 
This chapter discussed the verification of Hypothesis Number 1 
using the results of Student's t-test and a multiple regression with a 
dummy variable. Chapter V presents the results of the attempt to verify 
Hypothesis Number 2. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS- 
VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESIS NUMBER 2 
This Chapter discusses the attempt to determine the existence of 
a predictive function hypothesized in Hypothesis Number 2. The results 
of both Kendall's tau test and a multiple regression analysis are 
discussed for each type of social information presented to the subjects. 
5.1 Kendall's tau test. In an initial attempt to verify the second 
general hypothesis, Kendall's tau test was conducted to determine those 
independent variables that exhibited a linear relationship between the 
indicated importance of each variable singularly and the amount invested 
in the first company of each pair. This relationship took the form 
Y = AX + B where 
Y = amount invested in first company 
X = indicated importance of the independent variable. 
This section will be restricted to discussions of those linear 
relationships which predicted the amount invested in the companies 
receiving social information of a given type. The results of this test 
are found on Table 37. 
5.1.1 Corporate charitable contributions. Because Company A 
was the only company that disclosed a corporate charitable contribution, 
it is impossible to determine any linear relationships for the disclo¬ 
sure of such social information. 
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Possible relationships found for Company A which could be 
verified by future studies include direct relationships for the indepen¬ 
dent variable, Earnings Growth and Earnings per Share, and an inverse 
relationship for the financial ratio, Sales Growth. When the potential 
investors considered either Earnings Growth or Earnings per Share to be 
very important, they invested a large amount of money in Company A. The 
inverse relationship for Sales Growth can be interpreted as meaning that 
the potential investor who considered Sales Growth as an unimportant 
decision criterion invested more money in Company A than did the 
investor who considered this variable important. The relationships 
discussed above are illustrated in Figures 38-40. 
5.1.2. Pollution. The potential investors in four companies 
received social information concerning three types of pollution: air, 
water and noise. Of these disclosures, Company A received negative 
information on air pollution while Company F received a positive disclo¬ 
sure on the same subject. Company H disclosed the cleaning up of water 
pollution, and Company J received a fine for noise pollution. 
Of the several linear relationships seen on Table 37, only 
two patterns appeared in the results of Kendall’s tau test. When a 
potential investor received negative pollution information, the amount 
invested in the company was predicted as a function of the indicated 
importance of the independent variable, Earnings Margin. 
It can be conjectured that the potential investor who considered 
the Earnings Margin important realized that the ratio was temporarily 
decreased by the expenditures on pollution and so was willing to invest 
a large amount in the company based on future expectations. 
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Indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth (points) 
100 
Figure 38. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company A. 
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Figure 39. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings per Share and the amount invested in Company A. 
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Figure 40. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Sales 
Growth and the amount invested in Company A. 
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The positive social information given to Companies F and H 
resulted in an inverse linear relationship between the amount invested 
in the company and the indicated importance of the ratio, Return on Net 
Worth. This means that the more importance the potential investor 
placed on the independent variable, the smaller was the amount invested 
in the company. This relationship is shown in Figures 41-42. 
5.1.3. Relations with personnel. Of the three types of infor¬ 
mation given to potential investors on corporate personnel policies, 
Companies F and G disclosed negative information on discrimination while 
Company J spent money on child care services for employees. The only 
consistent patterns that were found in the results of Kendall's tau 
test were direct relations between the amount invested in the indepen¬ 
dent variables. Earnings Growth and Return on Net Worth, and the amount 
invested in the companies. 
It can be conjectured that the potential investors realized that 
the punitive expenditures due to discriminatory practices reduced the 
two earnings measures so that the differences in the ratios for the 
respective pairs of companies would be even larger in future years. 
Therefore, it appears that when potential investors considered 
either of the two variables to be a very important criterion in their 
decision-making, they invested heavily in the company making the 
disclosure. 
5.1.4 Corporate illegality. Under Kendall's tau test, the three 
types of corporate illegalities disclosed to the potential investors 
produced no common function expressing the hypothesized relationship 
between the amount invested in the company and the indicated importance 
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Figure 41. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company F. 
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on Net Worth (points) 
Figure 42. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of Return 
on Net Worth and the amount invested in Company H. 
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of an independent variable. It may be conjectured that the diversity of 
the types of infractions disclosed produced the lack of statistically 
significant results. 
The disclosure of illegal campaign contributions by Company C 
and an illegal employee bonuses by Company H, however, both resulted in 
a statistically significant linear relationship of the form Y = AX + B 
for the independent variable Price-Earnings Ratio. Since Kendall's tau 
test was run on the amount of money invested in the first company of 
each pair, the inverse of the sign of the coefficient found on Table 37, 
must be taken when the results of the second company of a pair is 
discussed. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between the 
amounts invested in Companies C and H and the indicated importance of 
the Price-Earnings Ratio. 
5.1.5 International involvement. Although the two types of 
social disclosure in the areas of international involvement concerned 
South Africa, Company C disclosed a loss from a cessation of operations 
in that country, while Company E established a plant there. The dif¬ 
ference of these disclosures may have been responsible for the lack of 
any common predictive function of the amount invested in either of the 
two companies. 
5.1.6 Quality of products. The two types of social disclosure 
presented concerning the quality of the products manufactured by the 
reporting company involved a lack of safety in the marketplace. In both 
cases the disclosures involved punitive measures. Company D disclosed 
a forced product withdrawal by a governmental agency while Company K 
disclosed the payment of a fine for an unsafe product. 
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Of the several independent variables that proved to have sta¬ 
tistically significant linear relationships using Kendall's tau 
test, the only linear relationship for both Company D and Company K was 
for the variable Earnings per Share. 
When the potential investors considered Earnings per Share to be 
very important in the decision-making process, they invested more money 
in the company disclosing the social information. 
It appears that the potential investor realized that the expen¬ 
ditures and losses due to poor quality products caused a one-time 
reduction in earnings that would be reflected in a longer difference in 
the Earnings per Share ratios of both companies in future years. 
5.1.7 Community involvement. The five disclosures concerning 
corporate community involvement given to the potential investors fell 
into the three areas of urban renewal and community assistance, training 
for minorities, and land reclamation and improvement. 
The results of Kendall's tau test revealed an inverse linear 
relationship between the indicated importance of the independent 
variable, Earnings Growth, and the amount of money invested in the com¬ 
panies that disclosed involvement in urban renewal and community 
assistance projects. 
The inverse relationships found for Companies D, E, and K can be 
interpreted to mean that when the potential investors considered the 
Earnings Growth as an important factor in decision making, they invested 
less in the company making the social disclosure than they did when they 
did not consider that independent variable as important. This rela¬ 
tionship can be shown in Figures 43-45. 
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Figure 43. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company D. 
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Earnings Growth (points) 
Figure 44. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company E. 
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Earnings Growth (points) 
Figure 45. Graphic presentation of the relation¬ 
ship between the investor-indicated importance of 
Earnings Growth and the amount invested in Company K. 
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5.2. Multiple regression analysis. In a final attempt to verify the 
second general hypothesis concerning the existence of a predictive func¬ 
tion expressing the relationship between the amount invested by the 
potential investor and the indicated importance of the nine independent 
variable taken together, a multiple regression was run. 
The results of this regression took the form Y=A^X^ + A2X2 + 
A3X3 + A4X4 + A5X5 + A5X5 + A7X7 + AgXg + A9X9 + B where 
Y = the amount invested in the first company of each pair 
X^ = the indicated importance of the Dividends per share 
X2 = the indicated importance of the Earnings Growth 
X3 = the indicated importance of the Earnings Margin 
X4 = the indicated importance of the Earnings per share 
X5 = the indicated importance of the Gross Margin 
Xg = the indicated importance of the Price-Earnings Ratio 
X7 = the indicated importance of the Return on Net Worth 
Xg = the indicated importance of the Sales Growth 
X9 = the indicated importance of the Social Responsibility 
Information 
The results of this test will be discussed by considering che 
type of social disclosure received by the potential investor. 
The results of the multiple regression are found in Table 38 
and any statistically significant findings are summarized in Table 39. 
5.2.1 Charitable contributions. The disclosure by Company A 
of a donation to charity of corporate products produced no statistically 
significant regression equation that expressed the hypothesized linear 
relationship 
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This helps to disprove the existence of such an equation 
hypothesized in Hypothesis Number 2. 
5.2.2 Pollution* Of the four types of pollution-related 
disclosure provided the potential investors, Company A was the only 
disclosure that did not produce any statistically significant results 
using the multiple regression analysis. 
However, as can be seen in Table 38, there was no consistent 
pattern in the results of the remaining analyses. The results were also 
inconsistent with those found using Kendall's tau test. 
It may be conjectured that the lack of results may be due to the 
interactive effects of the nine independent variables under the multiple 
regression analysis. 
5.2.3 Relations with personnel. Of the three types of social 
disclosure concerning personnel policies given to the potential 
investors, only the disclosure of the payment of a punitive fine 
resulting from a discrimination suit produced any statistically signifi¬ 
cant results. 
The multiple regression equation that produced a statistically 
significant coefficient took the form 
Y = AX2+ B, where 
X2 represents the importance attributed to the independent 
variable. 
Earnings growth. It may be conjectured that the lack of either 
additional results for the other two types of social disclosure or sitni- 
larily between the results of the multiple regression analysis and 
Kendall's tau test may be due to the effect of the interaction between 
195 
the independent variables. 
5,2.4, Corporate illegality. The three types of social infor¬ 
mation on corporate illegalities involved disclosures by Company B and C 
concerning the payment of fines incurred because of illegal corporate 
activities and by Company H for illegal payments to employees. 
The results of the multiple regression analysis produced no sta¬ 
tistically significant coefficients for Company H. However, there were 
statistically significant results for the companies disclosing payments 
of fines. 
The regression equation that was formed by the statistically 
significant coefficients of the regression analysis run on the data of 
Company B took the form 
Y = AgXg - A9X9 + B, where 
Xg represents the indicated importance of Sales Growth and 
X9 represents that of the Social Information. 
A similar equation involving the independent variable, Price- 
Earnings Ratio, with a positive coefficient resulted from the regression 
analysis on Company C. It took the form: Y = AgXg + B. 
The only similarity between these results and those of Kendall's 
tau test were for Company C. The lack of comparable results may be the 
result of the interaction between the independent variables that 
occurred in the multiple regression. These results further fail to con¬ 
firm the existence of the predictive function hypothesized in Hypothesis 
Number 2. 
5.2.5 International involvement. Although the two disclosures 
on corporate international involvement both concerned South Africa and 
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its racial policies, the only disclosure that produced statistically 
significant results was a loss due to divestiture of corporate interests 
in that country. 
The equation formed using the multiple regression analysis on 
the data from Company C contained the independent variable, Earnings 
Margin, and took the form 
Y = A3X3 + B 
Once again, these results failed to verify Hypothesis Number 2. 
5.2.6 Quality of products. Disclosure of the government’s 
forced product withdrawal for Company D was the only type of social 
disclosure that produced statistically significant coefficients under 
multiple regression. 
This test resulted in an equation which took the form: 
Yq = “A5X5 - A9X9 + B, where 
X5 is the indicated importance of the variable, Price-Earnings 
ratio and X9 is that of Social Imformation. 
The difference in the signs of the coefficients between those 
found on Table 38, and in the above equation is due to the formation 
of the regression equation. In the regression analysis, the equation 
was formed based on the amount invested in the first company of each 
pair. Therefore, the inverse sign must be taken when forming the 
equation discussed above. 
Once again, the differences in the results of the two tests may 
be due to the interactive effects of the nine independent variables. 
5.2.7 Community involvement. The five disclosures concerning 
community involvement given to the potential investors resulted in five 
197 
different regression equations. As can be seen on Table 39, there are 
no similarities across the several disclosures made by the companies. 
Once again, it can be conjectured that the lack of consistency 
in the results across the multiple regression analyses and as compared 
with Kendall’s tau test can be attributed to the effects of the 
interaction between the independent variables. 
In conclusion, the lack of consistency found in the results of 
the multiple regression analysis failed to verify Hypothesis Number 2: 
There exists a predictor function that will estimate the amount 
of money invested in a company by the investor as a function 
of the importance placed by the investor on the financial 
information on which the decision is based. 
This chapter discussed the results of the unsuccessful attempt 
to determine the predictive function hypothesized to exist in Hypothesis 
Number 2. Chapter VI will contain the conclusions to be drawn from the 
results of this study, the limitations of the research, and possible 
areas for additional study. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses the conclusions to be drawn from the sta¬ 
tistical analyses discussed in the previous chapter. The limitations of 
this study are described so that the reader can draw his/her conclusions 
about its validity. The last section of this chapter outlines addi¬ 
tional research that can be conducted. 
6.1. Results of the Test of 
Hypothesis Number 1 
The results of Student's t-test between the dependent variables 
of the control group and those of the treatment groups verified 
Hypothesis Number 1: 
Hypothesis Number 1 : The inclusion of corporate social 
responsibility information with corporate financial information 
will result in investment decisions by the individual investor 
which differ from those made in the absence of such information. 
Although the disclosure of pollution-related actions appears to 
be declining in frequency in corporate annual reports, investor response 
to such disclosures remains strong. Disclosure of costs relating to the 
installation of pollution control devices and the cleaning up of 
effluents discharged into a river produced significant investor 
responses. In both cases, investors "rewarded" the firms that reported 
positive pollution-related behavior by significantly increasing the 
amount of money that they invested in the companies, thereby verifying 
Operational Hypothesis Number 2. 
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Questionable corporate personnel policies are increasingly being 
disclosed both by the corporations themselves in their annual reports 
and governmental filings and by the media as legal actions are settled. 
The disclosure of corporate reimbursement of employees for a previously 
discriminatory salary schedule produced the statistically significant 
reduction in investment hypothesized in Operational Hypothesis Number 1. 
Potential investors apparently viewed this type of corporate behavior 
negatively, perhaps because such actions reflected a management philo¬ 
sophy that differed from their own. 
With the media consistently disclosing the poor quality of many 
products being sold in the marketplace, the potential investor has 
apparently become concerned with the potential impact of such disclo¬ 
sures on the corporation. The disclosure of an F.D.A.-forced withdrawal 
of a product from the market produced a statistically significant reduc¬ 
tion in the amount the potential investor was willing to invest in the 
company making the disclosure. This reaction verified the behavior 
hypothesized in Operational Hypothesis Number 1 and can best be 
illustrated by the subject who indicated quite emphatically that he had 
been involved in just such a recall. 
Corporations are increasingly expected to become involved in 
their communities. This involvement may take many forms. At odds with 
this expectation, however, may be the need for bigger, more modern manu¬ 
facturing facilities. This frequently results in corporate flight out 
of the cities to the suburbs. The disclosure of a company's improvement 
and expansion of an urban manufacturing facility resulted in a statisti 
in the amount invested in that company. This cally significant increase 
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behavior verifies Operational Hypothesis Number 2. It appears that the 
potential investors considered the disclosure of a firm's actions to 
improve their urban environment to be socially positive regardless of 
the monetary cost and was, hence, worthy of increased support. 
In conclusion, several specific types of social disclosure in 
the areas of pollution, personnel, quality of products and community 
involvement produced statistically significant investor responses that 
verified Hypothesis Number 1. Although studies have shown that institu¬ 
tional investors are influenced by certain types of social respon¬ 
sibility information (Longstreth and Rosenbloom, 1973), this appears to 
be the first reported study to verify this result for the individual 
investor. 
6.1.1. Additional tentative conclusions from the testing of Hypothesis 
Number 1. Several additional conclusions can be tentatively drawn from 
the results of the statistical tests that verified Hypothesis Number 1. 
Several different companies made disclosures concerning the 
payment of fines. The reasons for these levies included exceeding noise 
pollution standards, discriminatory personnel practices, corporate 
violation of investment and political campaign laws, and violation of 
product safety laws. None of these disclosures resulted in statisti¬ 
cally significant changes in investor behavior. Therefore, it can be 
tentatively concluded that the disclosure of court-levied fines for cor¬ 
porate misdeeds does not produce an investor response. 
The results of the investment patterns of the potential investor 
in Companies A and B consistently revealed a marked preference for 
Company A. Civen the magnitude of the difference in the financial 
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ratios of these two companies, it may be tentatively concluded that 
social information does not affect the investment decision when the 
financial information of the firms being considered differs 
substantially." There appears to have been no research done in the field 
of finance to determine the magnitude of the financial information at 
which the investor is no longer influenced in the investment decision by 
extraneous factors such as the social responsibility information. 
Analysis of the differences in investor-indicated importance of 
the financial ratios has produced a tentative conclusion regarding 
changes in investment criteria. The investor apparently seeks to 
justify his/her investment by changing the ratios considered important 
to those which substantiate the behavior pattern. An alternate 
interpretation of these data is that the social information causes a 
change in the interpretation and importance placed on the financial data 
that results in the change in investment pattern. Under either 
interpretation, major changes in the investor-indicated importance of 
the financial ratios occurred in this study and are open to 
interpretation. 
6.2. Verification of Hypothesis Number 2 
The attempt to determine a function to predict the monetary 
amount invested in companies reporting similar types of social respon¬ 
sibility information as a function of the investor-indicated importance 
of the eight financial ratios failed to confirm the existence of such a 
function. It appears that the subject's responses are uniquely indivi¬ 
dual and fail to exhibit any discernable pattern. 
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6.3. Limitations of This Research 
There are several limitations which affect the ability to 
generalize about the conclusions discussed earlier. 
One fault in this research is the relatively small number of 
data points in each response group. This may have resulted in the 
skewing of the results of the statistical tests due to outlying points. 
Since the Student's t-test conducted with several outlying points 
excluded failed to result in any substantive change in statistical 
significance, the magnitude of this possible difficulty has been 
reduced. The need for additional subjects was also discussed to verify 
the statistically significant relationships using the multiple 
regression with the dummy-coded variable. A second difficulty resulted 
from the inclusion in the research design of a pair of companies whose 
financial ratios differed substantially in magnitude and, in some cases, 
in algebraic sign. This may have resulted in the lack of significant 
results for this pair of companies. Therefore, additional types of 
social responsibility information may have resulted in statistically 
significant changes in investment patterns had the effect not been 
masked by the financial differences. In addition, there may have been 
investment functions predicted with the multiple regression analysis 
that were hidden by the skewed investment patterns of Companies A and B 
that may invalidate the results found in Hypothesis Two. 
Since the subjects were not placed in a "real-world situation 
where the investments involved an element of risk, the investment pat¬ 
terns found may not represent actual behavior but a desire to give the 
experimenter what she wants to get. In addition, the investment pat 
203 
terns and the importance attributed to the independent variables may 
have been influenced by the failure of the instrument to provide the 
subjects with the financial ratios they, as individuals, use in their 
personal investment strategies. The length of the instrument may have 
introduced a fatigue factor into the responses of the subjects to the 
latter pairs of variables. As such, the answers to the last pairs of 
companies may not be as accurate as those of the companies that appeared 
at the beginning of the instrument. 
The need to exclude several responses from analysis because of 
incorrect monetary investment or point allocation to the independent 
variables may have resulted in changes in the statistical significance 
of some of the conclusions that were based on significance at the ten 
percent level. The assumption made in this study that the subjects, by 
virtue of their professional expertise, were experienced in making 
investments and so had developed an investment strategy, may not be 
true. This potential weakness could be overcome by performing the 
experiment on such professions as investment brokership. 
6.4. Areas of Additional Research 
The topic of the effect of social responsibility information on 
the individual investor is an area that has received very little atten¬ 
tion from researchers until this time. One area meriting further 
exploration would be to determine the monetary value of social respon¬ 
sibility information at which statistically significant changes in 
investment strategy occur, a type of "investor break-even point. Such 
information may allay the fears corporations may have that social 
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responsibility disclosure will be detrimental to their attractiveness as 
investments. Further research in this area could determine the dif¬ 
ferences in the monetary "break-even" amounts for similar positive and 
negative social information. Another similar area of research would be 
to determine what differences in magnitude of financial ratios result in 
changes of investment patterns. By conducting this experiment both with 
and without social responsibility information, one might determine how 
such information affects the individual investor. One may also hold the 
financial ratios constant and vary the magnitude of a single social 
responsibility statement to determine the dollar amount which has a sta¬ 
tistically significant influence upon the investment decision. A study 
of this type could form one of the data points of a series of studies in 
which the monetary value is held constant and the social responsibility 
information provided changed. 
Another area for study would be to see if investment strategies 
as determined by the results of the multiple regression analysis hold 
over time. Another study could investigate any changes in investor 
response to types of social responsibility information over time. This 
would be important given the changes in disclosure over time that have 
appeared in the Ernst and Ernst study (1978). As has been suggested 
earlier, a study could be conducted to determine the difference in the 
magnitude of the financial ratios at which the investment decision is no 
longer influenced by extraneous factors (such as social responsibility 
information). This experimental design could be modified to Include a 
larger sample size to lessen the effects of outlying points on the 
results of the statistical tests. Additional modifications could be 
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made by performing the experiment using subjects in areas known to be 
experienced in investment decision-making such as financial analysts, 
investment advisors or members of corporate investment committees. This 
experiment could also be performed in a one-on-one setting with the 
researcher, thereby allowing the researcher to more thoroughly interpret 
the subject's responses. 
Another area for further research would be to change the type of 
subjects used to those who are less sophisticated in business. The use 
of college professors, union members, or students, for example, may 
result in responses different from those found in this study. Other 
changes in this study which could produce response changes to specific 
disclosures include giving discrimination information to women and 
racial minorities. Providing information on the type of industry 
involved might change the responses to disclosure of illegal payments or 
product safety. 
In conclusion, this research has added information to a field 
where research is lacking and has provided an indicator of potential 
areas of further research. Based on the findings of the previous 
chapters, this chapter has drawn several significant conclusions which 
merit further research. It further suggests some modifications of the 
present research design to remedy several weaknesses discussed in this 
chapter. Lastly, many areas of additional research are suggested in the 
largely unresearched field of investor response to social responsibility 
informat ion 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
On the following pages you are given financial information 
for five (5) pairs of firms which are roughly comparable (the risks 
have been matched). Each of these firms is listed in the Fortune 
500 list of largest industrials for the year 1976. 
1. You have $10,000 which must be invested in Companies A 
and B. Using the financial information provided on the following 
pages, indicate on the Response Sheet how you will allocate the 
$10,000 between these two firms. 
2. On the page entitled "Companies A and B," please 
allocate 100 points over the list of financial information to 
indicate the importance you attached to each of the pieces of 
financial information in making the allocation of your investment. 
If a piece of information was not used in your decision-making, 
please put a zero (0) on the appropriate line. 
3. Repeat steps (1) and (2) for Companies C and D, Companies 
E and F, Companies G and H, and Companies J and K respectively. 
Thank you for your assistance in my research. 
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Gross Margin 
Company A Company B 
.198 .276 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes .285 .016 
Earnings growth 1.923 (.754) 
Earnings margin .033 (.019) 
Cost of training program 
for the disadvantaged $0 $75,000 
Dividents per share $1.80 $ .80 
Price-earnings ratio 7.705 (3.423) 
Earnings per share 3.780 (3.360) 
Sales growth 1.118 1.192 
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COMPANIES A AND B 
Gross Margin 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes 
Earnings growth 
Earnings margin 
Cost of training program 
for the disadvantaged 
Dividents per share 
Price-earnings ratio 
Earnings per share 
Sales growth 
100 POINTS 
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Company C Company D 
Dividends per share $1.23 $1.73 
F.D.A. forced withdrawal of 
product from market $0 $300,000 
Sales growth 1.038 1.144 
Gross margin .047 .193 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes .196 .409 
Earnings growth .788 1.166 
Earnings per share $2.77 $4.19 
Price-earnings ratio 11.219 6.981 
Earnings margin .015 .050 
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COMPANIES C AND D 
Dividends per share 
F.D.A. forced withdrawal of 
product from market 
Sales growth 
Gross margin 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes 
Earnings growth 
Earnings per share 
Price-earnings ratio 
Earnings margin 
100 POINTS 
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Dividends per share 
Company E 
$1.05 
Donated money to communityfor 
urban renewal $500,000 
Earnings per share $4.51 
Earnings margin .082 
Gross margin .744 
Price-earnings ratio 12.971 
Earnings growth 1.051 
Sales growth 1.086 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes .340 
Company F 
' $ .60 
$0 
$3.89 
.050 
.281 
5.913 
1.218 
1.108 
.502 
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COMPANIES E AND F 
Dividends per share 
Donated money to community for 
urban renewal 
Earnings per share 
Earnings margin 
Gross margin 
Price-earnings ratio 
Earnings growth 
Sales growth 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes 
100 POINTS 
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Company G Company H 
Earnings per share $4.71 $4.12 
Earnings margin .086 .059 
Gross margin .360 .269 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes .600 .397 
Sales growth 1.201 1.113 
Earnings growth 1.619 1.352 
Price-earnings ratio 57.856 13.501 
Dividends per share $ .685 $1.70 
COMPANIES G AND H 
Earnings per share 
Earnings margin 
Gross margin 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes 
Sales growth 
Earnings growth 
Price-earnings ratio 
Dividends per share 
100 POINTS 
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Company J Company K 
Earnings per share $1.85 $2.92 
Gross margin .345 .326 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes .450 .200 
Fined for exceeding noise 
pollution standards $10,000 $0 
Earnings growth 1.397 1.206 
Dividends per share $ .22 $1,025 
Sales growth 1.361 1.033 
Price-earnings ratio 14.653 11.473 
Earnings margin .111 .064 
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COMPANIES J AND K 
Earnings per share 
Gross margin 
Return on net worth before 
depreciation and taxes 
Fined for exceeding noise 
pollution standards 
Earnings growth 
Dividends per share 
Sales growth 
Price-earnings ratio 
Earnings margin 
100 POINTS 
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